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Mark A. Graber* 
 
Mark Killenbeck’s Korematsu v. United States1 has 
important affinities with Dred Scott v. Sandford.2  Both decisions 
by promoting and justifying white supremacy far beyond what 
was absolutely mandated by the constitutional text merit their 
uncontroversial inclusion in the anticanon of American 
constitutional law.3  Dred Scott held that former slaves and their 
descendants could not be citizens of the United States4 and that 
Congress could not ban slavery in American territories acquired 
after the Constitution was ratified.5  Korematsu held that the 
military could exclude all Japanese Americans from portions of 
the West Coast during World War II.6  Both decisions 
nevertheless provided progressives with important doctrinal tools 
that they later employed when building a more egalitarian future.  
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott advanced a 
particularly robust notion of citizenship that Republicans, after 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, cited when vesting 
newly freed persons of color with a substantial array of rights.7  
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test into American law 
 
* Mark A. Graber is the Regents Professor at the University of Maryland Carey School 
of Law.  He is grateful for the help provided by the Arkansas Law Review at the University 
of Arkansas, most notably by Keaton Barnes, Taylor Spillers, and Tyler Mlakar, the 
comments given by Associate Peter Danchin and his colleagues at the University of 
Maryland Carey School of Law, and other comments by Mark Killenbeck, Sandy Levinson 
and Jack Balkin. 
1. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
2. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
3. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 406-12, 422-27 (2011); 
Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 
151, 151-52 (2021). 
4. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 423. 
5. See id. at 452. 
6. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24.  
7. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 101 (1866); CONG. GLOBE, 39th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1231 (1866). 
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that the Warren and Burger Courts relied on when striking down 
numerous laws that discriminated against persons of color.8 
Killenbeck celebrates strict scrutiny as a remarkable advance 
on the doctrines that structured the constitutional law of racial 
equality in the racist past of the United States.9  Federal and state 
courts before the Civil War provided almost no protection for 
persons of color, even in the few instances when judges 
acknowledged that persons of color might be state or federal 
citizens.10  At the turn of the twentieth century, federal and state 
courts did almost nothing to oppose the redemption of the South 
and the establishment of Jim Crow.11  Plessy v. Ferguson 
sustained legislation mandating separate but equal.12  Giles v. 
Harris announced courts could do little when states adopted 
subterfuges that disenfranchised almost all black citizens.13  
African Americans fared better in federal courts in the decades 
before Korematsu.14  Still, most judicial successes before World 
War II were confined to particularly egregious facts and easily 
evaded.15  The strict scrutiny test was the first occasion in which 
a Supreme Court majority announced a broad standard of review 
that could be wielded against white supremacy more generally 
rather than merely against discrete instances of white 
supremacy.16 
This essay explores how the constitutional law of race 
equality has evolved in the United States in ways that provide 
 
8. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 
U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).  For the development of the strict scrutiny test in race cases, see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1275-78 (2007). 
9. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201. 
10. See infra notes 69-94 and accompanying text.  
11. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 8-60 (2004). 
12. 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896). 
13. 189 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1903). 
14. See generally KLARMAN, supra note 11. 
15. The judicial decision outlawing state mandated residential segregation in 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917), was effectively undermined by the judicial 
decision sanctioning racially restrictive covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 332 
(1926).  The judicial decisions in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 540-41 (1927), and Nixon 
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88-89 (1932), striking down state laws prohibiting persons of color 
from voting in Democratic primaries were effectively undermined by the judicial decision in 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1935), which permitted the Democratic Party to 
prohibit persons of color from voting in Democratic primaries. 
16. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
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greater context for the strict scrutiny test and the Korematsu 
decision.  The contemporary Korematsu regime is structured by 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
judicial supremacy, and strict scrutiny.17  The Equal Protection 
Clause provides the textual hook for evaluating the 
constitutionality of race conscious measures, the Supreme Court 
of the United States is the institution primarily responsible for 
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, and strict scrutiny is 
the test or standard the Supreme Court uses to determine whether 
race conscious measures pass constitutional muster.18  Other 
regimes have been structured by different textual hooks, 
alternative conceptions of institutional authority, and other tests 
or standards for evaluating race conscious measures.  The Turner 
regime of the mid-1860s regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as 
the foundation for the constitutional law of racial equality.19  The 
Turner regime and the successor Strauder regime of the 1870s 
and 1880s vested Congress with the primary responsibility of 
determining how to implement the constitutional obligation to 
end the slave system and make persons of color full citizens.20  
The Strauder regime and successor Plessy regime of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries banned, at least 
officially, all race discriminations.21   
The Korematsu regime is clearly more egalitarian than the 
Costin/Manuel regime that structured the constitutional law of 
race equality before the Civil War, but the former has features that 
make that regime arguably less egalitarian in certain 
circumstances than the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes.  
The Turner regime that based the constitutional law of racial 
equality on the Thirteenth Amendment was more open than the 
Korematsu regime to race conscious measures designed to benefit 
persons of color and had no state action limit on federal laws that 
mandated racial equality.22  The Turner and Strauder regimes that 
 
17. See Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 189-201. 
18. Id. 
19. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339-40 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
20. Id.; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879). 
21. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310-12; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896). 
22. Compare Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40, with Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944). 
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required Congress to be the first mover when implementing 
constitutional commitments to racial equality were more 
conducive to racial equality than the Korematsu regime whenever 
the national legislature had a more expansive understanding of 
racial equality than the national judiciary.  The Strauder and 
Plessy regimes would, at least in theory, have declared 
unconstitutional the military order sustained in Korematsu 
because those regimes prohibited all race discriminations.   
The following pages contextualize rather than praise or bury 
the Korematsu regime.  Whether one particular regime better 
promotes racial equality than another depends on the particular 
problem, the balance of power in different institutions at a 
particular time, and particular perspectives.  Strict scrutiny might 
be a better approach than a per se ban on race classifications when 
regulating racial gangs in prisons.  The Supreme Court could not 
have decided Brown v. Board of Education when the Turner and 
Strauder regimes structured the constitutional law of racial 
equality because those regimes required Congress to be the first 
mover when implementing the post-Civil War Amendments.  
Whether a regime that permits affirmative action is better than 
one that does not depends on contested beliefs about whether 
affirmative action promotes race equality.  The argument below 
is simply that the Korematsu regime is one way of structuring the 
constitutional law of racial equality, not the only way.  That 
Americans committed to racial equality have adopted different 
regimes in the past opens questions about whether Americans  
might adopt different regimes in the future. 
Strict scrutiny is a standard only for race conscious measures 
such as the military order banning Japanese Americans from the 
West Coast.  That standard does not help determine whether a 
military order in 1943 banning disloyal citizens would have been 
considered a race discrimination if implemented only in 
California or, for that matter, whether the executive order at issue 
in Trump v. Hawaii23 that Killenbeck explores with great 
sophistication24 was a “Muslim ban.”  Korematsu’s ancestors 
 
23. 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
24. Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 201-23. 
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include such cases as Costin v. Washington,25 In re Turner,26 
Strauder v. West Virginia,27 and Plessy v. Ferguson.28  These 
decisions considered whether explicit race conscious measures 
passed constitutional muster.29  Although Killenbeck and the 
major opinions in Trump debated whether Korematsu belonged 
on Trump’s family tree,30 Trump’s more legitimate lineal 
ancestors include United States v. Cruikshank,31 Williams v. 
Mississippi,32 and McCleskey v. Kemp.33  The Justices in these 
instances refused to see or find race discrimination lurking behind 
laws or actions that on their face were not race conscious.34   
This essay explores the constitutional law of explicit race 
conscious measures.  This myopia admittedly exaggerates the 
egalitarian commitments of the Turner, Strauder, Plessy, and 
Korematsu regimes.  Racial hierarchies in the United States in the 
past and at present are as often structured by the refusal to 
acknowledge race as by what Americans do when they 
acknowledge race.  Americans, this essay documents, have often 
shamefully justified their willingness to use race conscious 
measures that discriminate against persons of color.  Americans 
have even more shamefully refused to see race discrimination 
when government employs ostensibly neutral measures in ways 
that oppress, often by intention, black Americans and other 
persons of color. 
I.  THE COSTIN/MANUEL REGIME 
Judge William Cranch’s opinion in Costin v. Washington  
articulated the principles that structured the status of citizens of 
 
25. 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266). 
26. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
27. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
28. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
29. See Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613-14; Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339-40; Strauder, 100 U.S. 
at 303; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540. 
30. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018); Id. at 2447 (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting); Killenbeck, supra note 3, at 152-159. 
31. 92 U.S. 542 (1875). 
32. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
33. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
34. See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 556; Williams, 170 U.S. at 225; McCleskey, 481 U.S. 
at 319. 
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color under antebellum constitutional law.35  The issue in that 
case was the constitutionality of the onerous restrictions that the 
corporation governing Washington D.C. placed on persons of 
color.36  Persons of color were required to register, provide bonds 
for good behavior, and obtain certificates from three white 
persons vouching for their character and employment.37  In sharp 
contrast to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s opinion in Dred 
Scott,38 Cranch’s opinion in Costin assumed that persons of color 
were citizens of the United States entitled to the rights of citizens 
of the United States.39  Costin acknowledged that “the 
constitution gives equal rights to all the citizens of the United 
States.”40  Cranch insisted, however, that governing officials 
could make legal distinctions among citizens.  Race was one 
important basis for legal distinctions.  Costin stated: 
In all the states certain qualifications are necessary to the 
right of suffrage; the right to serve on juries, and the right to 
hold certain offices; and in most of the states the absence of 
the African color is among those qualifications.  Every state 
has the right to pass laws to preserve the peace and the 
morals of society; and if there be a class of people more 
likely than others to disturb the public peace, or corrupt the 
public morals, and if that class can be clearly designated, it 
has a right to impose upon that class, such reasonable terms 
and conditions of residence, as will guard the state from the 
evils which it has reason to apprehend.41 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Manuel 
relied on similar principles when the judges concluded black 
citizenship was consistent with substantial race discrimination.42  
A unanimous court ruled that persons of color convicted of crimes 
could be hired out, even though white persons convicted of the 
 
35. 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856). 
39. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613. 
40. Id.  But cf. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404 (holding that persons of color were not 
citizens of the United States and were therefore not entitled to the rights of United States 
citizens). 
41. Costin, 6 F. Cas. at 613. 
42. 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838). 
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same crimes could not suffer this sanction.43  Judge William 
Gaston declared, “[h]is color and his poverty are the aggravating 
circumstances of his crime.”44  Gaston insisted that real 
differences between the races justified punishing citizens of color 
more severely than white citizens: 
Whatever might be thought of a penal Statute which in its 
enactments makes distinctions between one part of the 
community and another capriciously and by way of 
favoritism, it cannot be denied that in the exercise of the 
great powers confided to the legislature for the suppression 
and punishment of crimes, they may rightfully so apportion 
punishments according to the condition, temptations to 
crime, and ability to suffer, of those who are likely to offend, 
as to produce in effect that reasonable and practical equality 
in the administration of justice which it is the object of all 
free governments to accomplish.45 
That William Manuel was a citizen of North Carolina did not 
immunize him from discriminatory punishments because he was 
in a racial class that the state legislature had determined needed 
more severe sanctions to deter them from crime.   
The constitutional law of race equality in antebellum 
America was indistinguishable from the constitutional law of 
equality, more generally.  The Costin/Manual regime emphasized 
arbitrary laws rather than suspect classifications.46  No legal 
distinction was inherently more suspect than another or required 
legislators to meet a higher standard of proof—either as the end 
to be achieved or the relationship between the discrimination and 
that end.  John Marque Lundin points out that while antebellum 
law respected principles of “equality, reasonableness, 
impartiality, and protection of fundamental rights, the prohibited 
classification principle” dates from Reconstruction.47  Laws that 
singled out persons of color were constitutionally no different 
 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 35. 
45. Id. at 37. 
46. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 54-55 (Duke Univ. Press 
1993); John Marquez Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1999). 
47. Lundin, supra note 46, at 1139.  
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than laws that singled out bankers, taverns, women, or residents 
of E street.   
The constitutionality of legal distinctions and 
discriminations depended on whether they were based on real 
differences between the regulated and unregulated classes and 
whether the distinction or discrimination served the public 
interest.48  Any legislative distinction that served the public 
interest and was based on real differences between persons was 
constitutional.  Howard Gillman notes that the master principle of 
nineteenth century constitutional law was that when “a statute is 
enacted applying only to a particular class, it must appear that the 
public welfare demands such legislation by reason of the 
distinguishing characteristic of the class.”49  Abolitionists and 
antislavery advocates aside,50 no one considered race 
discriminations the paradigmatic example of an unconstitutional 
arbitrary distinction.  Most successful equality claims concerned 
property rights51 rather than discrimination based on race, gender, 
or ethnicity.52  No state court opinion issued before the Fourteenth 
Amendment indicated that a central purpose of any constitutional 
provision mandating equality was to limit race discriminations, 
that race discriminations were particularly offensive in light of 
constitutional commitments to equality, or that race 
discriminations required a higher degree of judicial scrutiny than 
other legislative discriminations.53   
Costin and Manuel were structured by this understanding of 
constitutional equality.  Neither treats race distinctions as any 
 
48. Id. at 1184–85. 
49. GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 93 (quoting Anonymous, Some Restrictions upon 
Legislative Power, 43 ALB. L.J. 25, 25–27 (1891)). 
50. See  JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 95, 96-97 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1951); Howard Jay Graham, The Early 
Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, Part I, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 479, 491, 
506 (1950); Howard Jay Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Part II, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 610, 613 (1950); WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 18 (Harvard Univ. Press 1988).   
51. See Planter’s Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 301, 325 (1848) (“This is . . . very 
invidious legislation, when applied to classes or to particular kinds of property before 
allowed to be held generally.  Legislation for particular cases or contracts . . . is of very 
doubtful validity.”). 
52. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1141.  
53. See Lundin, supra note 46, at 1181. 
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more or less offensive to the law than other distinctions.  Both 
explore whether real differences exist between the races and 
whether the law based on these differences serves the public 
interest.  Both conclude that racial differences exist that justify 
laws in the public interest.54  Neither assumes a different mode of 
analysis would be appropriate if white persons were being legally 
burdened.  Both treat constitutional equality as requiring justices 
to make fact judgments rather than rely on categorical analyses.55   
Many antebellum judicial decisions justifying racial 
discrimination did so by claiming that the main difference 
between white persons and persons of color was that only white 
persons were citizens.56  The Supreme Court of Tennessee, when 
sustaining a ban on black immigration to the state declared, “free 
negroes . . . are not citizens in the sense of the Constitution; and 
therefore when coming among us are not entitled to all the 
‘privileges and immunities’ of citizens of this State.”57  The 
Supreme Court of South Carolina, in White v. Tax Collector of 
Kershaw District, determining that free blacks were subject to a 
special tax, declared, “[a] firm and wise policy has excluded this 
class from the rights of citizenship in this and almost every State 
in which they are found.”58  Slaves gained few rights, the Supreme 
Court of Georgia declared, when freed by their former masters.59  
Bryan v. Walton decreed, “the act of manumission confers no 
 
54. Justice Lemuel Shaw in Roberts v. City of Boston engaged in similar analysis when 
holding that segregated schools were consistent with the equality and citizenship rights 
enjoyed by persons of color because separating the races promoted the public welfare.  He 
claimed, the school board could reasonably conclude that “the good of both classes of schools 
will be best promoted, by maintaining the separate primary schools for colored and for white 
children . . . .”  59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849). 
55. See Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266); 
State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20 (N.C. 1838). 
56. See Pendleton v. State, 6 Ark. 509, 512, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___ (1846); Aldridge v. 
Commonwealth, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 (Va. Gen. Ct. 1824) (declaring that persons of 
color were not “comprehended” by the state “Constitution or Bill of Rights”); Bryan’s Heirs 
v. Dennis, 4 Fla. 445, 453–54 (1852) (declaring that free persons of color are “neither 
freemen nor slaves”); Amy v. Smith, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 326, 344 (1822); see also MARK A. 
GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 29 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press 2006).  
57. State v. Claiborne, 19 Tenn. (Meigs) 331, 341 (1838); see Pendleton, 6 Ark. at 509, 
___ S.W.3d at ___ (sustaining a state ban on black immigration because persons of color 
could be neither citizens of the United States nor citizens of Arkansas). 
58. 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 1846). 
59. See Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 201-02 (1853). 
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other right but that of freedom from the dominion of the master, 
and the limited liberty of locomotion; that it does not and cannot 
confer citizenship, nor any of the powers, civil or political, 
incident to citizenship.”60  Florida case law maintained that free 
persons of color could not claim any rights at all as a matter of 
constitutional grace.61  “[T]he rights of free negroes,” Clark v. 
Gautier stated, “depend entirely upon municipal regulations.”62   
Costin and Manual established that black citizenship was no 
bar against race discrimination.  Jacksonians were convinced that 
real differences existed between white persons and persons of 
color.  Chancellor James Kent’s extraordinarily influential 
Commentaries on American Law declared that “[t]he African 
race, even when free, are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior 
rank and condition in society.”63  Sidney George Fisher, a leading 
northern political and constitutional commentator, maintained: 
These races are distinguished by clearly defined and 
different organic physical structure, and also by different 
mental and moral traits, more especially by inequality of 
mental and moral force, and have been so distinguished, 
without change, in all ages.64 
The same principles, at least in theory, governed actual laws 
that discriminated against persons of color as hypothetical laws 
that discriminated against white persons.  The crucial issue in 
both circumstances was whether racial differences were real and 
whether the law served the public interest.  This inquiry required 
justices to make fact inquiries.  Constitutional decision makers 
had to determine whether a real difference existed between the 
races.  They then had to determine whether the law based on that 
real difference served the public interest.  Such laws, providing 
benefits to black Americans denied to their white neighbors, did 
not exist before the Civil War because neither Jacksonian 
legislators nor Jacksonian judges could imagine a real difference 
 
60. Id. at 198. 
61. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 362 (1859). 
62. Id. at 363. 
63. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (John M. Gould ed., 
Little, Brown, & Co., 14th ed. 1896).  See, e.g., Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 339, 346 (1834).  
64. SIDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE LAWS OF RACE, AS CONNECTED WITH SLAVERY 
10 (Philadelphia, Willis P. Hazard 1860).  
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between white persons and persons of color that might justify a 
law that placed special burdens on white persons or gave special 
benefits to persons of color.65 
Judges enforced the constitutional law of equality during the 
Costin/Manual regime.  By the Civil War, a well-developed state 
jurisprudence existed establishing the basic parameters of 
constitutional equality.66  The Supreme Court of Tennessee, 
which was quite deferential in Manual when sustaining race 
discriminations against persons of color, was a judicial leader in 
setting the standards for scrutinizing discriminations between 
different classes of white persons.  Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 
when striking down a law that forbade courts from hearing certain 
lawsuits brought for the benefit of other persons, insisted that 
“every partial or private law which directly proposes to destroy or 
affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording 
remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and 
void.”67  Justice Nathan Green elaborated on the judicial 
responsibility for implementing constitutional “law of the land” 
clauses, declaring, “[d]oes it not seem conclusive then, that this 
provision was intended to restrain the legislature from enacting 
any law affecting injuriously the rights of any citizen, unless at 
the same time the rights of all others in similar circumstances 
were equally affected by it?”68 
An examination of race cases only would barely detect this 
commitment to judicial power.  Courts sustained almost all race 
conscious measures that were adjudicated before the Civil War.  
With the exception of a California decision holding that a state 
 
65. Melissa L. Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 245, 252–54 (1997). 
66. See GILLMAN, supra note 46, at 54; Saunders, supra note 65, 252–54; see also 
Durkee v. City of Janesville, 28 Wis. 464, 465 (1871) (citing numerous cases from numerous 
state courts decided before 1865 for the “principle of constitutional law which prohibits 
unequal and partial legislation upon general subjects . . . .”).  
67. 10 Tenn. 554, 555 (1831); see Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. 260, 269-70 (1829) 
(“That a partial law, tending directly or indirectly to deprive a corporation or an individual 
or rights to property, or to the equal benefits of the general and public laws of the land, is 
unconstitutional and void, we do not doubt.”); James v. Adm’rs of G.W. Reynolds, 2 Tex. 
250, 252 (1847) (“[G]eneral public laws, binding all the members of the community under 
similar circumstances, and not partial or private laws, affecting the rights of private 
individuals, or classes of individuals.”). 
68. State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831).  
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tax on Chinese immigrants was inconsistent with federal 
commerce power,69 no free state court declared unconstitutional 
any law discriminating against free persons of color.70  Free state 
justices sustained or implemented without commentary laws 
limiting the testimony of persons of color,71 allocating taxes on 
the basis of race,72 mandating different guardianship rules on the 
basis of race,73 prohibiting persons of color from attending public 
schools,74 banning persons of color from voting75 or holding 
public offices,76 forbidding persons of color from marrying a 
white person77 or performing marriages,78 and refusing to permit 
persons of color to reside in the state.79   
Southern courts were even worse.  The Supreme Court of 
Georgia in Bryan v. Walton highlighted the narrow distance 
between the legal status of free persons of color and the legal 
status of slaves when noting that:   
[T]he status of the African in Georgia, whether bond or free, 
is such that he has no civil, social or political rights or 
capacity, whatever, except such as are bestowed on him by 
 
69. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 171 (1857). 
70. But see Op. of J. Appleton, 44 Me. 521, 575–76 (1857) (declaring in an advisory 
opinion that free persons of color had a right to vote in Maine). 
71. See Clark v. Gautier, 8 Fla. 360, 361 (1859). 
72. See White v. Tax Collector of Kershaw Dist., 37 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 136, 136 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1846).  
73. See Thaxter v. Grinnell, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 13, 14–15 (1840). 
74. See Williams v. Dirs. of Sch. Dist., No. 6, Wright 579, 580 (Ohio 1834); Chalmers 
v. Stewart, 11 Ohio 386, 387 (1842); Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332, 332 (1850) (separate 
schools may be organized, but not constitutionally required); Draper v. Cambridge, 20 Ind. 
268, 269 (1863). 
75. See Hobbs v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 555-56 (Pa. 1837); State v. Deshler, 25 N.J.L. 
177, 188 (N.J. 1855); People v. Dean, 14 Mich. 406, 438 (1866); Anderson v. Milliken, 9 
Ohio St. 568, 570 (1859); Morrison v. Springer, 15 Iowa 304, 306 (1863). 
76. See State ex rel. Dirs. of E. & W. Sch. Dists. v. Cincinnati, 19 Ohio 178, 197 (1850) 
(holding that a school board director is not an officer of the state that must be held by a white 
person). 
77. See Samuel v. Berry, 7 Mich. 467 (1859); Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77, 78 (1852); 
Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 57 (1810). 
78. State v. Ct. of Common Pleas, 1 Ohio Dec. Reprint 20, 22 (Ohio 1843).  
79. People v. Downer, 7 Cal. 169, 170 (1857); Barkshire v. State, 7 Ind. 389, 389 
(1856); Nelson v. People, 33 Ill. 390, 390 (1864); Glenn v. People, 17 Ill. 105, 106-07 (1855) 
(upholding a ban on persons of color residing in the state though refusing to enforce the ban 
on other grounds).  Three Supreme Court Justices in the Passenger Cases approved state 
laws banning persons of color.  Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 429 (1849).  See also 
People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 142, 146 (1860) (dicta suggesting that prosecutors should be 
permitted to present evidence that Chinese residents tend to resist tax collection). 
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Statute; that he can neither contract, nor be contracted with; 
that the free negro can act only by and through his guardian; 
that he is in a state of perpetual pupilage or wardship; and 
that this condition he can never change by his own volition. 
. . . . 
He is associated still with the slave in this State, in some of 
the most humiliating incidents of his degradation.  —Like 
the slave, the free person of color is incompetent to testify 
against a free white citizen.  He lives under, and is tried by 
the same Criminal Code.  He has neither vote nor voice in 
forming the laws by which he is governed.  He is not allowed 
to keep or carry fire-arms.  He cannot preach or exhort 
without a special license, on pain of imprisonment, fine and 
corporeal punishment.  He cannot be employed in mixing or 
vending drugs or medicines of any description.  A white man 
is liable to a fine of five hundred dollars and imprisonment 
in the common jail, at the discretion of the Court, for 
teaching a free negro to read and write; and if one free negro 
teach another, he is punishable by fine and whipping, or fine 
or whipping, at the discretion of the Court.  To employ a free 
person of color to set up type in a printing office, or any other 
labor requiring a knowledge of reading or writing, subjects 
the offender to a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.80 
Free persons of color did not get an “0-fer” in slave state 
courts.  City of Memphis v. Winfield81 declared unconstitutional a 
curfew limited to free black citizens.  The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee described the measure as “an attempt to impair the 
liberty of a free person unnecessarily, to restrain him from the 
exercise of his lawful pursuits, and to make an innocent act a 
crime . . . .”82  The Supreme Court of Kentucky when declaring 
unconstitutional a law forbidding persons of color from defending 
themselves from an assault initiated by a white person declared 
that the legislative power in question “can not [be] exercise[d] 
over any man or class of men, be they aliens, free persons of color, 
or citizens.”83  The Supreme Courts of Virginia and Georgia held 
that a free person of color claimed as a slave had a right to habeas 
corpus, although both decisions interpreted statutes that did not 
 
80. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198, 202-03 (1853). 
81. 27 Tenn. 707, 709 (1848). 
82. Id. 
83. Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70, 75 (1820). 
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make explicit race discriminations.84  After noting that the statute 
granting rights to habeas corpus did not make a racial distinction, 
Judge Tucker of the Virginia Supreme Court stated, “[a] free 
negro, as well as a free white man, must be entitled to the benefit 
of the habeas corpus act, both according to its language, which is 
broad and general, and still more according to its spirit, which is 
yet more liberal and beneficent.”85  Georgia justices in State v. 
Philpot stated, “the free person of color enjoying personal liberty 
has the benefit of the habeas corpus secured to him by a 
constitutional guaranty.”86  No state court reached the conclusion 
that the legislature had unconstitutionally discriminated against 
free blacks, that a law that subjected all persons to the disabilities 
the legislature had imposed solely on the basis of race would have 
been constitutional. 
No consensus developed in the antebellum United States on 
the best textual hook to hang constitutional commitments to 
equality.  Cranch did not point to any provision in any constitution 
when in Costin he claimed, “the constitution gives equal rights to 
all the citizens of the United States . . . .”87  State courts were 
promiscuous when providing the constitutional underpinnings for 
equal rights.88  State decisions were rooted in general equality 
provisions,89 in “due process” or “law of the land” provisions,90 
on constitutional provisions prohibiting exclusive privileges or 
special laws,91 on separation of powers grounds92 or on general 
 
84. DeLacy v. Antoine, 34 Va. 438, 449 (1836); State v. Philpot, 1 Dud. 46, 46 (Super. 
Ct. Richmond Cnty. 1831). 
85. DeLacy, 34 Va. at 444. 
86. 1 Dud. at 52. 
87. Costin v. Corp. of Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266).  
But see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-27 (1857). 
88. Saunders, supra note 65, at 258. 
89. In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293, 360-61 (Ala. 1838); Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 326, 336-37 
(1825); City of Lexington v. McQuillan’s Heirs, 39 Ky. 513, 516 (1839) (relying on both the 
general equality provisions and provisions requiring “equal and uniform” taxation). 
90. Budd v. State, 22 Tenn. 483, 490-93 (1842); Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. 
Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838); Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 254 (1858). 
91. See Thomas v. Bd. of Comm’rs., 5 Ind. 4, 8 (1854) (citing numerous Indiana 
decisions declaring legislation “not within the constitutional prohibition of special and local 
legislation”); Smith’s Adm’rs. v. Smith, 2 Miss. 102, 103 (1834); McRee v. Wilmington, 47 
N.C. 186, 190 (1855); Geebrick v. State, 5 Iowa 491, 496-97 (1858); Norwich Gaslight Co. 
v. Norwich City Gas Co., 25 Conn. 19, 38 (1856). 
92. See Regents of Univ. of Md., 9 G. & J. at 411. 
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constitutional principles.93  The Supreme Court of Vermont, in 
Ward v. Barnard, without citing any particular provision in the 
state constitution, struck down a legislative act on the ground that 
“[a]n act conferring upon any one citizen, privileges to the 
prejudice of another, and which is not applicable to others, in like 
circumstances . . . , does not enter into the idea of municipal law, 
having no relation to the community in general.”94  Costin appears 
to have relied on the same belief that equality was implicit in 
American constitutionalism, even when not explicitly provided 
for by constitutional text. 
II.  THE TURNER REGIME 
Chief Justice Salmon Chase’s brief opinion on circuit in In 
re Turner captured the constitutional law of race equality during 
Reconstruction.95  Elizabeth Turner was emancipated by the 
Constitution of Maryland on November 1, 1864.96  She was 
almost immediately indentured to her former master Philemon T. 
Hambleton.97  The Maryland law of indentures at the time made 
a sharp distinction between whites and persons of color.98  As 
Chase summarized:  
The petitioner, under this indenture, is not entitled to any 
education; a white apprentice must be taught reading, 
writing, and arithmetic.  The petitioner is liable to be 
assigned and transferred at the will of the master to any 
person in the same county; the white apprentice is not so 
liable.  The authority of the master over the petitioner is 
 
93. Norwich Gaslight Co., 25 Conn. at 38. 
94. Ward v. Barnard, 1 Aik. 121, 128 (Vt. 1825); see Lewis, 3 Me. at 332-34; Reed v. 
Wright, 2 Greene 15, 27, 28 (Iowa 1849) (treating “law of the land” as a general principle); 
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396, 404-05 (1814); Jones’ Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. 59, 70-71 
(1836); State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. 599, 606 (1831); Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. 
554, 555 (1831); Jones v. Vanzandt, 13 F. Cas. 1047, 1048 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,502). 
95. 24 F. Cas. 337 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247).  For a discussion of Turner, see  
HAROLD H. HYMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE: IN RE TURNER 
AND TEXAS V. WHITE 127-39 (University Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS, 1997). 
96. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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described in the law as a ‘property and interest;’ no such 
description is applied to authority over a white apprentice.99 
Chase granted Turner’s petition for habeas corpus, releasing her 
from Hambleton’s custody on two grounds.  First, he declared that 
the indenture was an involuntary servitude that directly violated 
Section One of the Thirteenth Amendment.100  Second, Chase 
ruled that the Maryland indenture law violated the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, which was a constitutional exercise of congressional 
power under Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.  In re 
Turner stated: 
[T]he indenture set forth in the return does not contain 
important provisions for the security and benefit of the 
apprentice which are required by the laws of Maryland in 
indenture of white apprentices, and is, therefore, in 
contravention of that clause of the first section of the civil 
rights law enacted by congress on April 9, 1866, which 
assures to all citizens without regard to race or color, “full 
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 
of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens.”101 
The constitutional law of racial equality in the Turner regime 
had three foundations.  The Thirteenth Amendment supplied the 
textual hook.  Congress was the institution primarily responsible 
for implementing the constitutional ban on slavery.  Chase 
declared Hambleton’s failure to provide Turner with the benefits 
the Maryland law mandated for white persons violated federal 
legislation passed under Section Two of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.102  He did not maintain that those provisions of the 
indenture would be unconstitutional in the absence of federal 
legislation.  Congress was the first mover.  Congress when 
implementing the Thirteenth Amendment could take all steps 
necessary to ensure that former slaves were transformed into full 
citizens.  Chase claimed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was 
constitutional because “[c]olored persons equally with white 




101. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 340. 
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Republicans when debating the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 
the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Act emphasized the Thirteenth 
Amendment as the proper textual hook for the constitutional law 
of racial equality.104  Senator Lyman Trumbull’s speech 
introducing the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the Senate declared 
with reference to the Black Codes, “[t]he purpose of the bill under 
consideration is to destroy all these discriminations, and to carry 
into effect the constitutional amendment.”105  The Thirteenth 
Amendment’s ban on slavery extended to discriminations against 
persons of color because race discriminations in both the free and 
slave states were “badges of servitude made in the interest of 
slavery and as part of slavery.”106  Trumbull asserted, “[t]hey 
never would have been thought of or enacted anywhere but for 
slavery, and when slavery falls they fall also.”107   
Republican members of the House and Senate during early 
Reconstruction insisted that Congress was the institution 
primarily responsible for implementing the Thirteenth 
Amendment’s commitment to racial equality.  Their Thirteenth 
Amendment empowered Congress to legislate, not courts to 
constrain.  Senator Charles Sumner spoke of a “pledge[] to 
maintain the emancipated slave in his freedom,” a pledge that 
“must be performed by the national government.”108  “[W]hat 
makes this constitutional amendment a practical, living thing,” 
Senator William Stewart of Nevada stated, “is the power given to 
Congress to enforce it by appropriate legislation.”109  In his view, 
“it must for years be the effective power of Congress, cooperating 
with the Executive, that will protect the freedmen from 
oppression . . . .”110  Litigation standing alone, Republicans 
insisted, could not destroy the badges and incidents of slavery or 
the slave system.  When Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania 
suggested that persons of color sue to protect their rights,  Senator 
Henry Wilson of Massachusetts responded, “the Senator says that 
 
104. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 474 (1865). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 322. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 91. 
109. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 110 (1865). 
110. Id. 
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the Constitution of the United States protects these people.  I 
agree that it does so far as the Constitution can do it; and the 
amendment to the Constitution empowers us to pass the necessary 
legislation to make them free indeed . . . .”111  Representative 
Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota stated, “a grand abstract 
declaration, unenforced by the arm of authority, is not a 
protection.”112  
Congress was empowered under the Thirteenth Amendment 
to pass any legislation that helped transform former slaves into 
full citizens.  The revised Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill 
covered:  
[A]ll loyal refugees and freedmen, so far as the same shall 
be necessary to enable them as speedily as practicable to 
become self-supporting citizens of the United States, and to 
aid them in making the freedom conferred by proclamation 
of the commander-in-chief, by emancipation under the laws 
of States, and by constitutional amendment, available to 
them and beneficial to the republic.113 
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois maintained: 
[U]nder the constitutional amendment which we have now 
adopted, and which declares that slavery shall no longer 
exist, and which authorizes Congress by appropriate 
legislation to carry this provision into effect, I hold that we 
have a right to pass any law which, in our judgment, is 
deemed appropriate, and which will accomplish the end in 
view, secure freedom to all people in the United States.  The 
various State laws to which I have referred—and there are 
many others—although they do not make a man an absolute 
slave, yet deprive him of the rights of a freeman; and it is 
perhaps difficult to draw the precise line, to say where 
freedom ceases and slavery begins, but a law that does not 
allow a colored person to go from one county to another is 
certainly a law in derogation of the rights of a freeman.  A 
law that does not allow a colored person to hold property, 
does not allow him to teach, does not allow him to preach, is 
 
111. Id. at 340. 
112. Id. at 588. 
113. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 173-74 (1866). 
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certainly a law in violation of the rights of a freeman, and 
being so may properly be declared void.114 
This power to strike a death blow to slavery included the power 
to eradicate the slave system as well as slavery.  “Having 
prohibited slavery,” Donnelly insisted, “we must not pause for an 
instant until the spirit of slavery is extinct, and every trace left by 
it in our laws is obliterated.”115  Congress had to grant persons of 
color sufficient rights so that no vestige of human bondage 
remained.  Sumner stated, “[b]eyond all question the protection 
of the colored race in civil rights is essential to complete the 
abolition of slavery . . . .” 116 
Trumbull captured the essence of the Turner regime when 
he declared: 
I have no doubt that under this provision of the Constitution 
we may destroy all these discriminations in civil rights 
against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional 
amendment amounts to nothing.  It was for that purpose that 
the second clause of that amendment was adopted, which 
says that Congress shall have authority, by appropriate 
legislation, to carry into effect the article prohibiting 
slavery.  Who is to decide what that appropriate legislation 
is to be?  The Congress of the United States; and it is for 
Congress to adopt such appropriate legislation as it may 
think proper, so that it be a means to accomplish the end.  If 
we believe a Freedmen’s Bureau necessary, if we believe an 
act punishing any man who deprives a colored person of any 
civil rights on account of his color necessary—if that is one 
means to secure his freedom, we have the constitutional right 
to adopt it.  If in order to prevent slavery Congress deem it 
necessary to declare null and void all laws which will not 
permit the colored man to contract, which will not permit 
him to testify, which will not permit him to buy and sell, and 
to go where he pleases, it has the power to do so, and not 
only the power, but it becomes its duty to do so.117  
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited discrimination against 
persons of color when prohibiting slavery.  Congress was the 
 
114. Id. at 475. 
115. Id. at 585.   
116. Id. at 684. 
117. Id. at 322. 
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institution authorized to determine the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  Congress could pass any measure that promoted racial 
equality and full citizenship. 
The logic of Thirteenth Amendment foundations for the 
constitutional law of racial equality supported race conscious 
programs that benefitted persons of color as well as 
antidiscrimination measures.118  The fundamental question in the 
Turner regime was whether the law undermined slavery, the slave 
power, or the slave system.119  Laws that prevented discrimination 
against persons of color and laws that provided specific benefits 
to persons of color were both constitutional means for 
undermining the slave system and for making former slaves full 
citizens of the United States.  Representative Samuel W. Moulton 
of Illinois stated, “[t]he very object of the [Second Freedmen’s 
Bureau Bill] is to break down the discrimination between whites 
and blacks . . . .  Therefore I repeat that the true object of this bill 
is the amelioration of the condition of the colored people.”120  
Race conscious measures that protected persons of color were 
justified because real differences existed between longstanding 
white citizens and newly freed slaves.  
[N]ever before in the history of this Government have nearly 
four million people been emancipated from the most abject 
and degrading slavery ever imposed upon human beings; 
never before has the occasion arisen when it was necessary 
to provide for such large numbers of people thrown upon the 
bounty of the Government, unprotected and unprovided for 
. . . .  [C]an we not provide for those among us who have 
been held in bondage all their lives, who have never been 
permitted to earn one dollar for themselves, who, by the great 
constitutional amendment declaring freedom throughout the 
land, have been discharged from bondage to their masters 
who had hitherto provided for their necessities in 
consideration of their services?121   
Laws that discriminated against persons of color, by comparison, 
sought to re-establish in different form rather than eradicate 
 
118. This paragraph relies heavily on Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the 
Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985). 
119. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 388 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 632 (1866). 
121. Id. at 939.  
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human bondage.  Trumbull stated, “under this provision of the 
Constitution we may destroy all these discriminations in civil 
rights against the black man; and if we cannot, our constitutional 
amendment amounts to nothing.”122  
The Thirteenth Amendment law of racial equality did not 
have a state action limitation.  Chase in Turner declared the 
indenture unconstitutional, not the state law mandating different 
treatment for white apprentices and apprentices of color.123  “The 
alleged apprenticeship in the present case is involuntary 
servitude,” he maintained, “within the meaning of the[] words in 
the amendment.”124  Chase then observed “the indenture” violated 
the Civil Rights Act because that private bargain “d[id] not 
contain important provisions for the security and benefit of the 
apprentice, which are required by the laws of Maryland in 
indentures of white apprentices . . . .”125 
Charles Sumner when making a Thirteenth Amendment 
defense of what became the Civil Rights Act of 1875 made no 
reference to any state action limit on federal authority to make 
persons of color equal citizens.  The senior Senator from 
Massachusetts insisted that the scope of Congressional power 
under the constitutional ban on slavery was as broad as the scope 
of government power.126  If the federal or state government could 
regulate an institution, the federal government under the 
Thirteenth Amendment could require that institution to refrain 
from discriminating against persons of color.  Sumner declared, 
“[s]how me . . . a legal institution, anything created or regulated 
by law, and I show you what must be opened equally to all 
without distinction of color.”127  “Theaters and other places of 
public amusement” could be prohibited from engaging in race 
discrimination, even if they had no common law obligation to 
serve all customers because “they are public institutions, 
regulated if not created by law . . . .”128  Congress had the power 
 
122. Id. at 322. 
123. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 825 (1870). 
127. Id. at 242. 
128. Id. at 383. 
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to “open to all persons, without distinction of color” all 
“institutions which have the sanction of law, which depend upon 
law, which depend upon State or municipal authority.”129  
Regulations could be benefits.  “Whoever seeks the benefit of the 
law,” Sumner declared, “must show equality.”130  He insisted that 
private colleges be prohibited from discriminating against 
persons of color.  “I wish under this law to make it impossible for 
Harvard College to close its gates against a colored person[,]” he 
declared on May 21, 1873.131  “Take all our great institutions of 
learning.  They are not sustained by ‘moneys derived from 
general taxation,’ but they are ‘authorized by law.’”132  Sumner’s 
Civil Rights Act would have prohibited religious institutions from 
engaging in discrimination.  “[W]hen a church organization asks 
the benefit of the law by an act of incorporation,” Sumner stated, 
“it must submit to the great primal law of this Union—the 
Constitution of the United States, interpreted by the Declaration 
of Independence.”133 
III.  THE STRAUDER REGIME 
The Supreme Court in the 1870s modified the Turner regime 
by changing the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  Strauder v. West Virginia,134 Ex parte Virginia,135 and 
Commonwealth v. Rives136 completed the process by which the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment replaced 
the Thirteenth Amendment as the foundation for attacks on race 
discrimination.  The shift in textual hook had doctrinal 
consequences.  The cabining of the Thirteenth Amendment and 
corresponding rise of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section One 
 
129. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1869).  
130. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 280 (1869); see id. (“[A]ll that my bill 
proposes is that those who enjoy the benefits of law shall treat those who come to them with 
equality.”). 
131. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 3267 (1870). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 823; see id. at 896 (“[T]o apply to an incorporated association the great 
principles of our Government . . . does not in any respect interfere with religion . . . .”); 
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. app. 3 (1870). 
134. 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1879). 
135. 100 U.S. 339, 344 (1879). 
136. 100 U.S. 313, 317 (1879). 
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introduced the state action doctrine to the constitutional law of the 
United States.137  Constitutional decisionmakers interpreting the 
race-neutral Equal Protection Clause were far more prone to use 
colorblind rhetoric than Republicans during early Reconstruction 
who spoke of a constitutional obligation to transform former 
slaves into full citizens.138  Intimations of legislative supremacy 
morphed into commitments to legislative primacy.  Congress 
remained the institution constitutionally charged with 
implementing the Equal Protection Clause, but the Supreme 
Court determined the scope and nature of that constitutional 
commitment to racial equality. 
The Strauder regime was anticipated by influential dicta in 
the Slaughter-House Cases asserting that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment banned race discrimination 
and only race or analogous discrimination.139  Justice Samuel 
Miller’s brief analysis in that case on the constitutional ban on 
slavery limited the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment to 
“servitude.”140  The Fourteenth Amendment, in his view, 
contained the provisions that protected the rights of newly freed 
slaves.141  The Equal Protection Clause, Miller declared, was the 
constitutional provision that banned race discrimination.142  “The 
existence of laws in the States where the newly emancipated 
negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and 
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by 
[the Equal Protection C]lause . . . .”143  The Slaughter-House 
majority severed equal protection completely from the 
antebellum concerns with arbitrary discriminations that 
structured the Costin/Manuel regime and help explain why the 
persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment preferred race 
neutral language to a more explicit ban on race discrimination.144  
 
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
138. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309. 
139. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1872). 
140. Id. at 69; see also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24 (1883) (rejecting a claim that 
private discrimination violates the Thirteenth Amendment). 
141. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at 81. 
142. Id. 
143. Id.  
144. The best discussion of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction’s decision to adopt 
a race neutral Equal Protection Clause rather than an explicit ban on race discrimination is 
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Slaughter-House’s Equal Protection Clause prohibited race 
discrimination, whether arbitrary or not, and hardly any, if any, 
other discriminations, no matter how arbitrary.  Miller concluded: 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not 
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a 
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come 
within the purview of this provision.  It is so clearly a 
provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case 
would be necessary for its application to any other.145   
The Supreme Court in Strauder officially made the 
Fourteenth Amendment the constitutional foundation for the law 
of racial equality.146  Justice William Strong’s majority opinion, 
after quoting the text of Section One, declared: 
What is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be 
the same for the black as for the white; that all persons, 
whether colored or white, shall stand equal before the laws 
of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose 
protection the amendment was primarily designed, that no 
discrimination shall be made against them by law because of 
their color?  The words of the amendment, it is true, are 
prohibitory, but they contain a necessary implication of a 
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored 
race,—the right to exemption from unfriendly legislation 
against them distinctively as colored,—exemption from 
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, 
lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which 
others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards 
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.147 
Racial discriminations stood on a different constitutional footing 
than other discriminations.  States, Strong wrote, “may confine 
[jury] selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons 
within certain ages, or to persons having educational 
 
Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction and the 
Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q.  287 (2015). 
145. Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. at  81. 
146. For an important discussion of Strauder, see Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. 
West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight on the Tensions Contained 
Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST. LOUIS L. J. 603 
(2018).  
147. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1879). 
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qualifications.”148  Echoing Slaughter-House on the limited scope 
of equal protection, the Strauder opinion continued, “[w]e do not 
believe the Fourteenth Amendment was ever intended to prohibit 
this.  Looking at its history, it is clear it had no such purpose.  Its 
aim was against discrimination because of race or color.”149   
Strong endorsed the Turner regime’s commitment to an 
absolute ban on discrimination against former slaves.150  The 
Strauder/Virginia/Rives opinions followed Turner by not 
exploring whether real differences existed between white persons 
and persons of color that might justify limiting juries only to 
white people.  Strong never discussed whether the West Virginia 
law prohibiting persons of color from serving on criminal juries 
served a social interest.  He did not consider whether real 
differences existed between white persons and persons of color 
that justified excluding persons of color from juries.  What 
mattered for the purpose of the constitutional law of equality 
under the Fourteenth Amendment was that the State had engaged 
in race discrimination.  Strong’s majority opinion in Rives 
declared, “[t]he plain object of [the post-Civil War Amendments] 
was to place the colored race, in respect of civil rights, upon a 
level with whites.  They made the rights and responsibilities, civil 
and criminal, of the two races exactly the same.”151  Ex parte 
Virginia reiterated this claim.152  Strong asserted: 
One great purpose of these amendments was to raise the 
colored race from that condition of inferiority and servitude 
in which most of them had previously stood, into perfect 
equality of civil rights with all other persons within the 
jurisdiction of the States.  They were intended to take away 
all possibility of oppression by law because of race or 
color.153   
 
148. Id. at 310. 
149. Id.; see also State v. Underwood, 63 N.C. 98, 99 (1869) (striking down without 
explaining in any detail a state law prohibiting persons of color from testifying against white 
persons as inconsistent with the state constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866). 
150. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310. 
151. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879). 
152. See 100 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1879). 
153. Id.; see also Underwood, 63 N.C. at 98-99. 
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Justice John Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy more 
explicitly captured the distinction the Turner and Strauder 
regimes made between sociological difference and racial 
equality.154  Harlan endorsed the Costin/Manuel regime’s 
understanding that real differences exist between the races.  He 
wrote: 
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this 
country.  And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in 
education, in wealth and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will 
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great 
heritage, and holds fast to the principles of constitutional 
liberty.155 
These sociological differences, however, did not make a legal 
difference.  Harlan continued: 
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there 
is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of 
citizens.  There is no caste here.  Our Constitution is color-
blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among 
citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal 
before the law.  The humblest is the peer of the most 
powerful.  The law regards man as man, and takes no account 
of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights as 
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved.156 
Discrimination was unconstitutional, Harlan made clear, even 
when real differences existed between the races. 
Strauder broke from the Turner regime by adopting what 
later became known as a “banned categories” approach rather 
than a ban on discrimination against persons of color.157  
Congress, when implementing the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
mandate for racial equality, had passed race conscious measures 
that favored former slaves, while insisting that persons of color 
enjoy the civil rights of white persons.158  Strauder and 
subsequent cases ruled out legislation making African Americans 
“the special favorite of the laws . . . .”159  A constitutional law of 
 
154. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 554-56 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
155. Id. at 559. 
156. Id. 
157. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 383-84 (Harvard Univ. Press 1986). 
158. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text. 
159. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883). 
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racial equality rooted in the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment was designed to secure a “perfect 
equality of civil rights” rather than provide former slaves and 
persons of color with the rights and resources necessary to 
become full American citizens.160 
The late Strauder regime introduced the state action doctrine 
to American law.161  The Thirteenth Amendment that provided 
the foundations for the Turner regime banned slavery in toto, not 
merely state laws that sanctioned slavery.162  Turner working 
within those parameters explored whether the agreement between 
Hambleton and Turner was constitutional and whether that 
agreement violated federal laws implementing the Thirteenth 
Amendment.163  Justice John Harlan’s dissent in the Civil Rights 
Cases articulated the Turner regime’s understanding that 
individual behavior as well as government action was subject to 
constitutional regulation.  He maintained: 
Congress, therefore, under its express power to enforce [the 
Thirteenth A]mendment, by appropriate legislation, may 
enact laws to protect that people against the 
deprivation, because of their race, of any civil rights granted 
to other freemen in the same State; and such legislation may 
be of a direct and primary character, operating upon States, 
their officers and agents, and, also, upon, at least, such 
individuals and corporations as exercise public functions and 
wield power and authority under the State.164 
The Fourteenth Amendment that provided the foundation for the 
Strauder regime excluded private discrimination when declaring, 
“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.”165  The majority opinion in the Civil 
Rights Cases emphasized the insertion of “No State” in Section 
One.166  Justice Joseph Bradley insisted:  
It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited.  
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-
 
160. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879). 
161. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 6. 
162. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
163. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247). 
164. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 36 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
165. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
166. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11-12. 
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matter of the amendment.  It has a deeper and broader scope.  
It nullifies and makes void all State legislation, and State 
action of every kind, which impairs the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures 
them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, 
or which denies to any of them the equal protection of the 
laws . . . .  It does not invest Congress with power to legislate 
upon subjects which are within the domain of State 
legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State 
legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to.  It does 
not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for 
the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of 
redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of 
State officers executive or judicial, when these are 
subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the 
amendment.  Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly 
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment; but they are secured 
by way of prohibition against State laws and State 
proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by 
power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of 
carrying such prohibition into effect; and such legislation 
must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State 
laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction 
of their operation and effect.167 
In sharp contrast to Turner’s focus on the legal relationship 
between Hambleton and Turner, Justice Bradley’s opinion 
discussed only what state officials had done and had not done.  
The relationship between Robinson and the Memphis & 
Charleston Railroad Company under the Strauder regime was 
none of the Constitution’s business.168 
Strong’s majority opinions in Ex parte Virginia, Strauder, 
and Rives modified the Turner regime’s institutional 
commitments by developing what we might call legislative 
primacy.169  Ex parte Virginia introduced legislative primacy to 
the constitutional law of the United States when declaring: 
It is not said the judicial power of the general government 
shall extend to enforcing the prohibitions and to protecting 
 
167. Id. 
168. See id. at 13. 
169. See generally Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879); Strauder v. West Virginia, 
100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). 
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the rights and immunities guaranteed.  It is not said that 
branch of the government shall be authorized to declare void 
any action of a State in violation of the prohibitions.  It is the 
power of Congress which has been enlarged.  Congress is 
authorized to enforce the prohibitions by appropriate 
legislation.  Some legislation is contemplated to make the 
amendments fully effective.  Whatever legislation is 
appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the 
amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce 
submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to 
all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights 
and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or 
invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the domain of 
congressional power.170 
The constitutional law of race equality under legislative primacy 
requires that Congress be the first mover.  Litigants may assert 
rights under the Equal Protection Clause only after Congress 
passes a statute implementing the Equal Protection Clause.  
Congress may implement, but not interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Federal courts must review all exercises of 
congressional power under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to ensure that Congress, when regulating race 
discrimination, has remained within judicially enforceable 
constitutional limits on federal power.171   
Strauder illustrates legislative primacy in action.  Strong 
insisted the litigants base their claim on federal constitutional and 
federal statutory law.172  After “[c]oncluding . . . that the statute 
of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of jurors . . . 
against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the 
equal protection of the laws to a colored man,” he did not 
immediately declare the law unconstitutional.173  Instead, Strong 
turned to federal statutory law.  Strauder continued, “it remains 
only to be considered whether the power of Congress to enforce 
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by appropriate 
legislation is sufficient to justify the enactment of sect. 641 of the 
 
170. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345-46. 
171. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
172. See Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
173. Id. at 310. 
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Revised Statutes.”174  Strauder succeeded in Strauder because 
Congress had passed a law implementing his right against race 
discrimination in jury selection and the Justices independently 
determined that the federal law in question passed constitutional 
muster.175  Strauder and Ex parte Virginia were correct because 
the West Virginia state legislature and Virginia bench were 
violating a congressional ban on race discrimination in jury 
selection and Congress had the power to pass that ban under 
Sections One and Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.176  At no 
point did any decision in the Strauder/Virginia/Rives trilogy 
indicate the federal judiciary could in the absence of a federal 
statute declare unconstitutional under Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment state laws limiting juries to white 
citizens.   
Federal judicial practice in race cases during the late 
nineteenth century was structured by this institutional 
commitment to legislative primacy.  From 1868 until 1896, every 
case the Supreme Court decided on the constitutional meaning of 
racial equality concerned the constitutionality and scope of 
federal laws implementing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, or 
Fifteenth Amendments.177  Some cases were brought by persons 
of color claiming rights under the federal statutes Congress 
passed when implementing the post-Civil War Constitution.178  
Other cases were brought by white persons claiming the federal 
law under which they were indicted was not warranted by the 
post-Civil War Constitution or that their indictments were not 
warranted by federal laws implementing the post-Civil War 
Constitution.179  The Justices acknowledged in dicta the 
 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 310-11. 
176. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. 
177. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text. 
178. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 365 (1886); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 
113-14 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 379-80 (1880); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 304; 
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 315 (1879).  In Pace v. Alabama, Justice Stephen Field 
declared that the plaintiff claimed that laws prohibiting interracial marriage “conflict[] with 
. . . the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”  106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883).  Field’s brief analysis, 
however, also maintained that the prohibition did not conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 
1866.  Id. at 584-85. 
179. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1887); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 
629, 641 (1883); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 4-5 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 
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possibility of claims to racial equality that had no statutory 
foundation.  “Th[e] [Thirteenth A]mendment, as well as the 
Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil Rights 
Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without any 
ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any 
existing state of circumstances.”180  Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court for a quarter of a century did not adjudicate a single claim 
that persons had rights under the post-Civil War Amendments 
independent of the rights Congress had granted by federal law.  
Judge William Woods in United States v. Hall captured the 
foundational institutional principle of judicial practice in cases 
raising constitutional questions about racial equality when he 
declared, “to guard against the invasion of the citizen’s 
fundamental rights, and to insure their adequate protection, as 
well against state legislation as state inaction, or incompetency, 
the [Fourteenth A]mendment gives congress the power to enforce 
its provisions by appropriate legislation.”181  When discussing the 
Equal Protection Clause in particular, Woods asserted, 
“[C]ongress has the power, by appropriate legislation, to protect 
the fundamental rights of citizens of the United States against 
unfriendly or insufficient state legislation . . . .”182 
IV.  THE PLESSY REGIME 
The Supreme Court in Plessy maintained the textual hook of 
the Strauder regime, while abandoning post-Reconstruction 
institutional commitments and modifying racial equality 
 
339, 340 (1879); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 544-46 (1875); United States v. 
Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1875); see also Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 
590 (1871) (finding that Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not permit removal of a case to federal 
court when state law forbade the witnesses of color from testifying in a criminal case).  The 
Supreme Court in a series of cases also sustained federal laws protecting persons of color as 
constitutional exercises of congressional power under Article I, Section 4 or inherent federal 
authority to protect the integrity of federal elections or federal prisoners.  See Ku-Klux Cases, 
110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884) (Congress has power independently of the post-Civil War 
Amendments to prohibit private persons from preventing persons of color from voting); 
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 284 (1892).  For an important discussion of these 
powers, see generally PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF 
RECONSTRUCTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 2011). 
180. 109 U.S. at 20. 
181. 26 F. Cas. 79, 81 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871) (No. 15,282). 
182. Id. at 81. 
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doctrine.183  The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment during the late nineteenth and first part of the 
twentieth centuries provided the textual foundation for the 
constitutional law of racial equality.  Federal courts replaced 
Congress as the institution primarily responsible for 
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality.  
The constitutional law of racial equality bifurcated.  Racial 
discriminations remained per se unconstitutional.  Racial 
distinctions were constitutional if, as the revived antebellum 
Costin/Manuel regime mandated, they were rooted in real 
differences between the races and advanced the public welfare.184 
Plessy further entrenched the Fourteenth Amendment as the 
textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality.  Justice 
Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion, following Slaughter-
House185 and the Civil Rights Cases,186 cast aside arguments that 
race discrimination was an aspect of slavery or a slave system.  
“Slavery,” he said when rejecting a Thirteenth Amendment attack 
on a Louisiana law mandating race segregation in street cars, 
“implies involuntary servitude—a state of bondage; the 
ownership of mankind as a chattel, or at least the control of the 
labor and services of one man for the benefit of another, and the 
absence of a legal right to the disposal of his own person, property 
and services.”187  As Miller asserted in Slaughter-House,188 
Brown in Plessy maintained the Fourteenth Amendment was 
enacted because the constitutional ban on slavery did not cover 
the Black Codes or related discriminations against former 
slaves.189  The Thirteenth Amendment, he stated, “was regarded 
 
183. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1896). 
184. See id. at 543-44, 548, 550-52; Costin v. Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613-14 
(C.C.D.C. 1821) (No, 3,266); State v. Manuel, 3 & 4 Dev. & Bat. 20, 37 (N.C. 1838).  
185. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (construing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) 36, 69 (1872)).   
186. See 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).  
187. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542. 
188. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 70-71 (the Black Codes “forced upon the 
statesmen who had conducted the Federal government in safety through the crisis of the 
rebellion, and who supposed that by the thirteenth article of amendment they had secured the 
result of their labors, the conviction that something more was necessary in the way of 
constitutional protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much.  They 
accordingly passed through Congress the proposition for the fourteenth amendment . . . .”). 
189. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-44. 
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by the statesmen of that day as insufficient to protect the colored 
race from certain laws which have been enacted in the Southern 
States, imposing upon the colored race onerous disabilities and 
burdens . . . .”190  The Fourteenth Amendment was Brown’s 
source for the constitutional commitment to “the absolute equality 
of the two races before the law . . . .”191  The ensuing discussion 
in Plessy elaborated on the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole.  
Brown did not consider the distinctive meaning of any provision 
in Section One.  Plessy concluded, “we think the enforced 
separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce of the 
state, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored 
man, deprives him of his property without due process of law, nor 
denies him the equal protection of the laws . . . .”192 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
became the specific textual hook for the constitutional law of 
racial equality over the next thirty years.  Justice John Harlan did 
not mention the Due Process Clause when discussing what 
clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment supported a judicial 
decision sustaining a local law that provided high school 
education for white children but not for children of color.  His 
opinion in Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education 
declared:  
[W]e cannot say that this action of the state court was, within 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, a denial by the 
state to the plaintiffs and to those associated with them of the 
equal protection of the laws or of any privileges belonging 
to them as citizens of the United States.193 
Gong Lum v. Rice omitted  the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
as a textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality.194  
Chief Justice William Howard Taft’s unanimous opinion stated:  
The case then reduces itself to the question whether a state 
can be said to afford to a child of Chinese ancestry born in 
this country, and a citizen of the United States, the equal 
protection of the laws, by giving her the opportunity for a 
 
190. Id. at 542. 
191. Id. at 543. 
192. Id. at 548. 
193. 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899). 
194. See 275 U.S. 78, 85 (1927).  
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common school education in a school which receives only 
colored children of the brown, yellow or black races.195   
When federal courts immediately before the New Deal spoke on 
the constitutional law of racial equality, they interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause and only the Equal Protection Clause.  Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., in Nixon v. Herndon declared 
unconstitutional a state law prohibiting persons of color from 
voting in primary elections because the Fourteenth Amendment 
“denied to any State the power to withhold from [African 
Americans] the equal protection of the laws.”196 
The Plessy regime divided the law of racial equality into the 
law of race discriminations and race distinctions.  Gilbert Thomas 
Stephenson’s influential Race Distinctions in American Law 
detailed the nature and significance of these categories.  He wrote: 
[T]here is an essential difference between race distinctions 
and race discriminations.  North Carolina, for example, has 
a law that white and Negro children shall not attend the same 
schools, but that separate schools shall be maintained.  If the 
terms for all the public schools in the State are equal in 
length, if the teaching force is equal in numbers and ability, 
if the school buildings are equal in convenience, 
accommodations, and appointments, a race distinction exists 
but not a discrimination.197 
Race discriminations were per se unconstitutional.  Such a law, 
Stephenson declared, “necessarily implies partiality and 
favoritism.”198  Race distinctions were constitutional if, as the 
Costin/Manuel regime required, they were based on real 
differences between the races and promoted the good of both 
races.  Race Distinctions in American Law explained: 
Identity of accommodation is not essential to avoid the 
charge of discrimination.  If there are in a particular school 
district twice as many white children as there are Negro 
 
195. Id. 
196. 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927); see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932) 
(“The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted as it was with special solicitude for the equal 
protection of members of the Negro race, lays a duty upon the court to level by its judgment 
these barriers of color.”). 
197. GILBERT THOMAS STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 2-3 
(1910). 
198. Id. at 4. 
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children, the school building for the former should be twice 
as large as that for the latter.  The course of study need not 
be the same.  If scientific investigation and experience show 
that in the education of the Negro child emphasis should be 
placed on one course of study, and in the education of the 
white child, on another; it is not a discrimination to 
emphasize industrial training in the Negro school, if that is 
better suited to the needs of the Negro pupil, and classics in 
the white school if the latter course is more profitable to the 
white child.  There is no discrimination so long as there is 
equality of opportunity, and this equality may often be 
attained only by a difference in methods.199 
State courts during the second half of the nineteenth century 
had struggled with whether to distinguish race discriminations 
from race distinctions.  Sumner, serving as counsel in Roberts v. 
City of Boston, insisted that Boston engaged in unconstitutional 
race discrimination when mandating separate schools for white 
children and children of color.200  He declared, “[t]he separation 
of children in the public schools of Boston, on account of color or 
race, is in the nature of caste, and is a violation of equality.”201  
Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s unanimous opinion in Roberts 
maintained that government authorities had made a constitutional 
race distinction.  Shaw “[c]onced[ed] . . . in the fullest manner, 
that colored persons . . . are entitled by law . . . to equal rights,”202 
but insisted that governing authorities could consistently develop, 
with this state constitutional commitment to equality, a “system 
of distribution and classification” as long as “this power is 
reasonably exercised” and served “the best interests of both 
classes of children . . . .”203  Controversies over segregation 
intensified in state courts after the Civil War.204  Some state courts 
 
199. Id. at 3. 
200. See 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 201-03 (1849). 
201. Id. at 202 (argument of Charles Sumner). 
202. Id. at 206. 
203. Id. at 209.  For a detailed account of the debate over segregated schools in Boston, 
see J. Morgan Kousser, “The Supremacy of Equal Rights”: The Struggle Against Racial 
Discrimination in Antebellum Massachusetts and the Foundations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 941 (1988). 
204. For the struggle over school segregation in state constitutional law and practice 
during the fifty years after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, see J. Morgan Kousser, 
Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the University of Oxford (Feb. 28, 1985), in DEAD END: 
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in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries took Sumner’s 
position that state segregation laws were racial discriminations.  
The Supreme Court of Iowa, when declaring unconstitutional a 
local ordinance segregating schools, deduced from the principle 
that “all the youths are equal before the law” the holding that a 
school board could not constitutionally “deny a youth admission 
to any particular school because of his or her nationality, religion, 
color, clothing or the like.”205  Other state courts followed Roberts 
and sustained such measures as race distinctions.  The Supreme 
Court of Ohio channeled Chief Justice Shaw when concluding, 
“[e]quality of rights does not involve the necessity of educating 
white and colored persons in the same school . . . .”206  “Any 
classification which preserves substantially equal school 
advantages,” Judge Day’s unanimous opinion concluded, “is not 
prohibited by either the State or federal constitution . . . .”207 
Plessy sided with Ohio against Iowa when sustaining a local 
ordinance mandating state segregation on streetcars.208  Brown’s 
opinion cited Roberts when anticipating Stephenson’s distinction 
between race discriminations and race distinctions.209  He 
declared:  
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the 
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LITIGATION ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
IN SCHOOLS (1986).  
205. Clark v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 24 Iowa 266, 277 (1868); see also People v. Quincy, 
101 Ill. 308, 314-15 (1882); Crawford v. Sch. Bd. for Sch. Dist. No. 7, 137 P. 217, 220 (Or. 
1913). 
206. State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198, 211 (1871); see also Puitt v. 
Comm’rs of Gaston Cnty, 94 N.C. 709, 719 (1888); State ex rel.  Stoutmeyer v. Duffy, 7 
Nev. 342, 347-48 (1872). 
207. Garnes, 21 Ohio St. at 211. 
208. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 545 (1896) (referencing Garnes, 21 Ohio 
St. at 210).  
209. See id. at 544 (“The great principle . . . is, that by the constitution and laws of 
Massachusetts, all persons without distinction of age or sex, birth or color, origin or 
condition, are equal before the law . . . .  But, when this great principle comes to be applied 
to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, 
that men and women are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that 
children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to the same 
treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled and regulated by law, are equally 
entitled to the paternal consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and 
security.”) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 
(5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1849)).  
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nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish 
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as 
distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of 
the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.210   
Race discriminations that abridged “the absolute equality of the 
two races before the law” were per se unconstitutional.211  Brown 
cited Strauder and other cases in which courts had ruled persons 
of color were unconstitutionally denied rights granted to white 
people.212  None of these cases required investigation into real 
differences between the races and whether the law advanced the 
public good.  Racial distinctions, by comparison, were governed 
by the antebellum principle that different treatment passed 
constitutional muster if the different treatment was based on real 
differences between people and promoted the public good.  
Brown’s opinion in Plessy declared, “every exercise of the police 
power must be reasonable, and extend only to such laws as are 
enacted in good faith for the promotion of the public good, and 
not for the annoyance or oppression of a particular class.”213   
The Louisiana segregation law satisfied both prongs of the 
constitutional test for race distinctions.214  The Plessy majority 
had no doubt that real differences existed between the races.  
“[D]istinction[s] which [are] founded in the color of the two 
races,” Brown confidently stated, “must always exist so long as 
white men are distinguished from the other race by color . . . .”215  
The judicial majority was as confident that race segregation 
promoted the public welfare.  Brown maintained that state 
legislatures, when mandating racial separation, had acted “with 
reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the 
people, and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the 
preservation of the public peace and good order.”216 
Harlan appears to have accepted Plessy’s differentiation 
between race distinctions and race classifications, but not the 




212. See id. at 545-46. 
213. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550. 
214. Id. at 550-51. 
215. Id. at 543. 
216. Id. at 550. 
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famously claimed in Plessy that “[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind,”217 but he was willing in other cases to treat race conscious 
measures as making race distinctions rather than race 
discriminations.218  His opinion in Cumming,219 after noting that 
the plaintiff had not attacked the constitutionality of race 
segregation per se,220 endorsed differential racial treatment that, 
Harlan claimed, was based on real differences between the races 
and advanced the public good.  His unanimous opinion for the 
court held that a local school board decision could 
constitutionally meet a financial crisis by closing the high school 
for students of color while keeping open the high school for white 
students when the alternative was closing the elementary school 
for children of color.221  The school board’s decision to keep open 
the school more children of color attended, Harlan concluded, 
“was in the interest of the greater number of colored children 
. . . .”222  The ordinance at issue in Plessy did not meet this public 
good standard.  Harlan pointed out, “[e]very one knows that the 
statute in question had its origin in the purpose . . . to exclude 
colored people from coaches occupied by or assigned to white 
persons.”223  Segregation in this instance, he continued, did not 
advance the good of all races but was rooted in unconstitutional 
notions “that colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that 
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white 
citizens[.]”224  Harlan repeated this emphasis on public purposes 
when dissenting in Berea College v. Kentucky.225  Government 
could regulate private education, in his view, when “such 
instruction is . . . harmful to the public morals or imperils the 
public safety.”226  Harlan thought the Kentucky ban on integrated 
private schools did not meet this standard because students of 
 
217. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
218. Justice Harlan joined the Supreme Court’s decision in Pace v. State, 106 U.S. 583 
(1883), which sustained an Alabama law banning interracial marriage and punishing sexual 
relationships outside of marriage more severely when the participants were of different races. 
219. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 541-45 (1899). 
220. See id. at 543-44. 
221. See id. at 544-45. 
222. Id. at 544. 
223. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
224. Id. at 560. 
225. See 211 U.S. 45, 67-69 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
226. Id. at 67.   
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different races were “receiving instruction which is not in its 
nature harmful or dangerous to the public . . . .”227 
The Plessy regime abandoned the Strauder regime’s eroding 
institutional commitment to legislative primacy in race cases.  
That commitment never took hold outside of the constitutional 
law of race equality.  No Supreme Court opinion, when discussing 
the constitutional rights of butchers and women in the Slaughter-
House Cases228 and Bradwell v. Illinois,229 respectively, 
maintained or implied that the judicial role under the post-Civil 
War Constitution was limited to determining whether 
congressional statutes implementing Section One of the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were constitutional.  The 
judicial decisions that provided the foundations for the freedom 
of contract assumed that federal courts had independent power to 
declare state laws unconstitutional and need not wait for 
congressional guidance.230  Dicta shortly after Strauder was 
decided indicated that, in a proper case, the Justices would 
abandon legislative primacy when determining the constitutional 
law of race equality.  “Th[e Thirteenth] Amendment, as well as 
the Fourteenth,” Justice Joseph Bradley’s opinion in the Civil 
Rights Cases declared, “is undoubtedly self-executing without 
any ancillary legislation, so far as its terms are applicable to any 
existing state of circumstances.”231  The Justices in 1896 finally 
harmonized the constitutional law of race equality with the 
constitutional law of other facets of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Plessy and the Plessy regime exhibited the same commitments to 
judicial supremacy that developed in other areas of constitutional 
law during the late nineteenth centuries.232 
 
227. See id. at 68 (citing in support of dissent freedom of contract cases that insisted 
that government regulations that imposed differential burdens had to be based on real 
differences between people and serve the public good, but did not cite Strauder or any case 
declaring race discriminations to be per se unconstitutional).   
228. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
229. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
230. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 
113, 132-33 (1876). 
231. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
232. See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(1989). 
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Plessy was the first case discussing the constitutional law of 
racial equality in which the Justices, following existing practice 
in non-race cases, discussed only the meaning of Section One of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.233  No opinion commented on 
existing federal legislation or the debates in Congress over race 
segregation that occurred when Congress was considering what 
became the Civil Rights Act of 1875.234  Justice John Marshall 
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy assumed that federal courts had 
independent authority to implement Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  He wrote, “[h]owever apparent the 
injustice of such legislation may be, we have only to consider 
whether it is consistent with the Constitution of the United 
States.”235  At no point did that dissent consider or even mention 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, or any other law Congress had 
passed implementing the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.236  Justice Henry Billings Brown’s majority opinion 
did not point to that failure to provide a statutory as well as a 
constitutional hook for Plessy’s complaint.  Brown assumed, with 
Harlan, that the sole issue in Plessy was whether segregation was 
consistent with the post-Civil War Constitution and not whether 
the judiciary, rather than Congress, was empowered to make that 
determination.237 
Plessy set the tone for the next fifty years.  Congress did not 
pass legislation implementing the post-Civil War 
Amendments.238  Courts did not first look to legislation already 
 
233. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); see also Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1120-31 (1995). 
234. See McConnell, supra note 233, at 1120-31 (discussing such debates). 
235. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
236. Homer Plessy’s lawyers also discussed only constitutional issues.  See Brief for 
Plaintiff in Error at ___, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. 210), 1896 WL 13990; 
Brief for Plaintiff in Error, Plessy v. Ferguson at ___, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No. ___), 1893 
WL 10660. 
237. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542 (“The constitutionality of this act is attacked upon the 
ground that it conflicts both with the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, abolishing 
slavery, and the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits certain restrictive legislation on the 
part of the States.”). 
238. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Section 5’s Forgotten Years: Congressional Power 
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Before Katzenbach v. Morgan, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 
47, 56, 82 (2018) (noting that Congress debated at some length between Reconstruction and 
the Great Society measures designed to implement the Fourteenth Amendment but did not 
pass any legislation). 
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on the books when determining the constitutional law of equal 
protection.  Williams v. Mississippi, decided two years after 
Plessy, implicitly affirmed Plessy’s unspoken institutional 
premise.239  Justice Joseph McKenna’s majority opinion held that 
Mississippi’s voting laws that were race neutral on their face did 
not violate Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
plaintiffs had to prove discriminatory administration, not merely 
discriminatory motivation.240  As in Plessy, the Justices discussed 
only the constitutional rules.  McKenna did not consider whether 
the plaintiff might have a claim under federal statutory law, nor 
did he treat federal statutory law as relevant to judicial power 
under the post-Civil War Constitution.241  Subsequent cases 
declaring race discriminations violated the Equal Protection 
Clause were as oblivious to national legislation as subsequent 
cases holding that race distinctions were constitutional.  Federal 
courts had become the first mover in the constitutional law of race 
equality.  Whether and when states could implement race 
conscious legislation depended entirely on the judiciary.  Persons 
reading such decisions as Gong Lum or Herndon would have no 
clue that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vested Congress 
with the power to implement the Equal Protection Clause or even 
that Article I of the Constitution established a national legislature. 
V.  THE KOREMATSU REGIME 
The Korematsu regime abandoned the doctrine of the Plessy 
regime, while maintaining that regime’s textual hook and 
institutional commitments.  The Justices in Korematsu insisted 
that the constitutional law of racial equality required courts to 
employ a balancing test, with a strong thumb on the side of formal 
racial equality.242  One size fits all.  Strict scrutiny became the 
governing standard whether the law at issue made what the Plessy 
regime classified as a race discrimination or a race distinction, 
and whether that law discriminated in favor of white persons or 
 
239. 170 U.S. 213 (1898). 
240. Id. at 222-23. 
241. See id. 
242. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216-20 (1944). 
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persons of color.243  The Equal Protection Clause remained the 
source for the constitutional law of racial equality.244  Federal 
courts cited the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when determining whether race conscious state 
measures passed the strict scrutiny test.245  The justices 
maintained the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
“reverse incorporated” the Equal Protection Clause against the 
federal government when determining whether race conscious 
congressional measures passed the strict scrutiny test.246  
Legislative primacy was consigned to oblivion.  Federal courts 
were often the first mover in determining the constitutional law 
of racial equality.  That constitutional law, with the exception of 
some flirtations by Warren Court Justices with legislative 
supremacy, was what courts said was the constitutional law of 
racial equality.   
Korematsu introduced the strict scrutiny test to American 
constitutional law.247  The first substantive paragraph of Justice 
Hugo Black’s majority opinion declared: 
It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such 
restrictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must 
subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such 
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.248 
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone’s majority opinion in 
Hirabayashi v. United States seemed to reach the same 
conclusion that racial discrimination would be constitutionally 
 
243. Id. 
244. Id.  
245. Id. 
246. For reverse incorporation, see Mark A. Graber, Subtraction by Addition? The 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, 112  COLUM. L. REV. 1501, 1532-34 (2012); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation and 
Reverse Incorporation, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 
(Terry Eastland ed., 1995). 
247. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20. 
248. Id. at 216; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) 
(Murphy, J., concurring) (“Except under conditions of great emergency a regulation of this 
kind applicable solely to citizens of a particular racial extraction would not be regarded as in 
accord with the requirement of due process of law contained in the Fifth Amendment.”). 
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tolerated only when state or federal laws were motivated by 
pressing public necessity.249  Stone stated: 
Because racial discriminations are in most circumstances 
irrelevant and therefore prohibited, it by no means follows 
that, in dealing with the perils of war, Congress and the 
Executive are wholly precluded from taking into account 
those facts and circumstances which are relevant to measures 
for our national defense and for the successful prosecution 
of the war, and which may in fact place citizens of one 
ancestry in a different category from others.250  
The strict scrutiny test, as applied in Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi, was arguably less protective of Japanese Americans 
than the standards laid down during the Strauder and Plessy 
regimes.  The Japanese exclusion order was a race discrimination 
rather than a race distinction.  In sharp contrast to Cumming, no 
justice maintained that removal benefited more Japanese 
Americans than the order harmed.  No justice pretended that the 
military believed with Stephenson that “equality of opportunity” 
on the West Coast for white persons and persons of color was best 
“attained only by a difference in methods.”251  The burdens of 
exclusion fell entirely on Japanese Americans.  Constitutional 
decision makers from Reconstruction to World War II had 
insisted that such race discriminations were per se 
unconstitutional.  Plessy stated, “[t]he object of the [Fourteenth 
A]mendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of 
the two races before the law . . . .”252  Korematsu and Hirabayashi 
violated that principle.  The Korematsu regime was the first to 
interpret the post-Civil War Constitution as permitting 
constitutional authorities to engage in race discrimination when 
that race discrimination served a public interest, albeit a very 
pressing public interest.253  Justice Frank Murphy in Hirabayashi 
observed, “[t]oday is the first time, so far as I am aware, that we 
have sustained a substantial restriction of the personal liberty of 
 
249. 320 U.S. at 113-14. 
250. Id. at 100. 
251. STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 3. 
252. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896). 
253. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-19. 
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citizens of the United States based upon the accident of race or 
ancestry.”254 
Korematsu was a clearer break from the official 
constitutional law of the Plessy regime than from the racist 
constitutional practices of that time.  A strong case can be made 
that constitutional authorities at the turn of the twentieth century 
would have held constitutional federal or state laws that imposed 
a wartime curfew on persons of color or excluded such persons 
from certain jurisdictions during wartime had such measures been 
promulgated and subjected to constitutional scrutiny during the 
Strauder and Plessy regimes.  Equally as strong a case can be 
made that those constitutional authorities would have reworked 
the Strauder/Plessy ban on race discriminations to encompass 
situations when “pressing public necessity” was thought to 
require imposing unique burdens on members of one race.255  
Faced with a Korematsu-like fact situation, the racist Fuller Court 
would have almost certainly adjusted the line between race 
discriminations and race distinctions, and not have applied 
mechanically the existing ban on all race discriminations.256  
Rather than maintain, as Stephenson did, that a race 
discrimination “necessarily implies partiality and 
favoritism[,]”257 constitutional authorities might have tweaked 
that claim so that only policies that “implie[d] partiality and 
favoritism[]”258 were race discriminations.  The point is that such 
a move was not explicitly made before World War II.  Korematsu, 
from the perspective of 1944, weakened the Plessy regime’s 
commitment to racial equality, even if that weakening was more 
likely in theory than in actual practice. 
Korematsu improved upon standards the Plessy regime 
employed when considering race classifications, but that 
improvement was limited and may have been more theoretical 
than real.  Black’s opinion suggests that only race discriminations 
 
254. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 111 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
255. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
256. See generally OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 
1888-1910 at 352 (2006) (discussing the racism of the Fuller Court). 
257. STEPHENSON, supra note 197, at 4. 
258. Id. 
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that advance vital social purposes pass constitutional muster.259  
Preventing racial mixing on street cars might not meet that 
standard.  Still, Korematsu did not overrule Plessy or comment 
adversely on any past decision sustaining an alleged race 
classification.  A racist southern constitutional decisionmaker 
during the first half of the twentieth century would have little 
difficulty finding that preventing racial amalgamation or fights 
between the races was a “[p]ressing public necessity . . . .”260  The 
Supreme Court of Virginia, when justifying bans on interracial 
marriage, declared: 
We are unable to read in the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution, or in any other provision of that great 
document, any words or any intendment which prohibit the 
State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial integrity 
of its citizens, or which denies the power of the State to 
regulate the marriage relation so that it shall not have a 
mongrel breed of citizens.  We find there no requirement that 
the State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of 
racial pride, but must permit the corruption of blood even 
though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship.  
Both sacred and secular history teach that nations and races 
have better advanced in human progress when they 
cultivated their own distinctive characteristics and culture 
and developed their own peculiar genius.261 
A judge more attentive to strict scrutiny might have tweaked this 
opinion a bit but would not have changed the result. 
Korematsu retained the Plessy regime’s and, for that matter, 
the Costin/Manuel regime’s deference to elected officials when 
determining whether race conscious means advanced pressing 
social ends.  The strict scrutiny test in Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi was limited to ends.  The federal government was 
entitled to impose a curfew on Japanese Americans and exclude 
Japanese Americans from the West Coast because such 
regulations were designed to prevent sabotage and a successful 
Japanese invasion of California.262  Preventing a Japanese 
invasion of California was a compelling government end.  
 
259. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20. 
260. Id. at 216. 
261. Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955). 
262. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216-20. 
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Korematsu was excluded from the West Coast, Korematsu 
asserted, “because we are at war with the Japanese Empire, 
because the properly constituted military authorities feared an 
invasion of our West Coast . . . .”263  The Supreme Court did not 
heighten the degree to which justices had previously scrutinized 
race conscious means to purported government ends.  
Government officials had to establish only some relationship 
between the race conscious measure and the end to be achieved.  
Stone in Hirabayashi stated, “it is enough that circumstances 
within the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for 
maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the 
decision which they made.”264  Justice William O’Douglas’s 
concurring opinion in that case stated, “[w]here the orders under 
the present Act have some relation to ‘protection against 
espionage and against sabotage,’ our task is at an end.”265  The 
Justices were as deferential to governing officials when 
determining whether the exclusion orders satisfied the 
requirement that race conscious measures be based on real 
differences between the races.  If the military had some basis for 
determining that real differences existed between Japanese 
Americans and other citizens, that was good enough during World 
War II to sustain a race conscious measure discriminating against 
some persons of color.  Black stated, “[t]here was evidence of 
disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities considered 
that the need for action was great, and time was short.”266  “The 
fact alone that attack on our shores was threatened by Japan rather 
than another enemy power,” Stone declared in Hirabayashi, “set 
those citizens apart from others who have no particular 
associations with Japan.”267  
Three developments occurred after World War II that made 
the Korematsu regime more racially egalitarian than the Plessy 
 
263. Id. at 223; see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 94-95 (1943) (“The 
challenged orders were defense measures for the avowed purpose of safeguarding the 
military area in question, at a time of threatened air raids and invasion by the Japanese forces, 
from the danger of sabotage and espionage”). 
264. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102. 
265. Id. at 106 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
266. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24. 
267. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101. 
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regime.268  First, the Supreme Court obliterated the Plessy 
regime’s distinction between race distinctions and race 
discriminations.  Second, the Supreme Court required that 
government officials adopting race conscious measures meet a 
higher standard for means as well as for ends.  Third, 
constitutional decision makers became far more suspicious than 
the Korematsu majority that race conscious measures were 
actually based on real differences between the races.   
The Korematsu regime clearly broke from the Plessy regime 
only when the justices abandoned the distinction between 
constitutional race distinctions and unconstitutional race 
discriminations.  This process began during the 1950s when the 
Supreme Court indicated that government actions that made race 
relevant to a person’s legal standing were subject to strict 
scrutiny, even if in a formal sense those measures did not treat 
persons of color worse than white persons.269  Bolling v. Sharpe 
held that statutes mandating race segregation had to meet the 
same standard Korematsu demanded for race discriminations.270  
Citing both Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Chief Justice Earl 
Warren’s majority opinion declared, “[c]lassifications based 
solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since 
they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally 
suspect.”271  Race consciousness by the 1960s was the touchstone 
for strict scrutiny rather than discrimination between white 
persons and persons of color who had engaged in the same 
behavior.  Justice Byron White’s majority opinion in McLaughlin 
v. Florida, when striking down a state law that punished 
interracial premarital sex more severely than premarital sex 
between persons of the same race, declared, “[j]udicial inquiry 
under the Equal Protection Clause . . . does not end with a 
showing of equal application among the members of the class 
defined by the legislation.”272   
 
268. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 8, at 1273-74 (discussing the development of strict 
scrutiny). 
269. Id. at 1277. 
270. 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
271. Id. at 499. 
272. 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).   
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The mature Korematsu regime insisted on scrutinizing race 
conscious means as strictly as Korematsu purportedly scrutinized 
government ends.  By the mid-1960s, government officials could 
no longer point to a rational basis or the equivalent of “evidence 
of disloyalty on the part of some” when defending race 
classifications or discriminations.273  The constitutional law of 
racial equality required race conscious measures to be necessary 
or narrowly tailored means to their purported government ends.  
“[N]ecessity,” Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in 
McLaughlin declared, “not mere reasonable relationship, is the 
proper test.”274  Government officials at the turn of the twenty-
first century could no longer blithely expect judicial deference 
when they insisted a race conscious measure was based on real 
differences between the affected races.  Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor insisted that “skepticism” rather than deference was the 
attitude courts should take when determining whether a race 
conscious measure was a narrowly tailored means to a compelling 
government end.275  “Any preference based on racial or ethnic 
criteria,” she declared in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 
“must necessarily receive a most searching examination.”276 
Korematsu did not specify the textual hook for the 
constitutional law of racial equality when the federal government 
adopted race conscious policies.  Black placed more emphasis on 
constitutional powers than constitutional rights.  His opinion 
noted that the military orders at issue in Korematsu were attacked 
“as an unconstitutional delegation of power . . . beyond the war 
powers of the Congress, the military authorities and of the 
President,” and “a constitutionally prohibited discrimination 
. . . .”277  The express holding of Korematsu focused entirely on 
the Article I powers of Congress and the Article II powers of the 
President.  Black declared, “we are unable to conclude that it was 
beyond the war power of Congress and the Executive to exclude 
 
273. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).  
274. Bolling, 379 U.S. at 197 (Harlan, J., concurring); see id. at 194 (“Such 
classifications bear a far heavier burden of justification.”); see also id. at 196 (“Such a law 
. . . bears a heavy burden of justification . . . and will be upheld only if it is necessary, and 
not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.”). 
275. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223-24, 227 (1995).  
276. Id. at 223 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 276, 273 (1986)).  
277. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217. 
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those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the 
time they did.”278  When discussing what constituted “a 
constitutionally prohibited discrimination,”279 Black did not 
mention much less discuss the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause, another provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Thirteenth Amendment or any provision in the Bill of Rights.   
Hirabayashi was more forthcoming.  Justice Stone 
announced that the Fifth Amendment provided the textual hook 
for the constitutional law of racial equality when the federal 
government adopted race conscious policies.  “The questions for 
our decision,” he stated, “are whether the particular restriction . . . 
was adopted by the military commander in the exercise of an 
unconstitutional delegation by Congress of its legislative power, 
and whether the restriction unconstitutionally discriminated 
between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of other 
ancestries in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”280  At the onset 
of the Korematsu regime, a gap existed between the rights 
enumerated in the first eight amendments to the Constitution and 
the rights enumerated by the post-Civil War Amendments.  The 
Supreme Court during World War II was no more willing to 
interpret the Fifth Amendment as holding the federal government 
to standards mandated by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment than the justices had been willing to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as holding the states to the 
standards mandated by the Fifth Amendment.281  Stone in 
Hirabayashi declared, “[t]he Fifth Amendment contains no equal 
protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory 
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due 
process.”282  While “[i]t is true,” Murphy agreed: 
 
278. Id. at 217-18. 
279. Id. at 217. 
280. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83 (1943); see also id. at 89 
(Appellant’s “contentions are only that Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative 
power to the military commander by authorizing him to impose the challenged regulation, 
and that, even if the regulation were in other respects lawfully authorized, the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the discrimination made between citizens of Japanese descent and 
those of other ancestry.”). 
281. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
282. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100. 
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[T]hat the Fifth Amendment, unlike the Fourteenth, contains 
no guarantee of equal protection of the laws . . ., [i]t by no 
means follows, however, that there may not be 
discrimination of such an injurious character in the 
application of laws as to amount to a denial of due process 
of laws as that term is used in the Fifth Amendment.283 
As both the Stone and Murphy opinions indicated, the 
Korematsu regime regarded the Equal Protection Clause as the 
appropriate textual hook for determining whether state race 
conscious policies were constitutional.284  The Equal Protection 
Clause provided the constitutional foundations for the judicial 
decisions declaring state mandated segregation unconstitutional.  
The Supreme Court in Brown framed the question before the 
Justices as whether “segregation . . . deprive[d] the plaintiffs of 
the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”285  Loving v. Virginia held that “restricting the 
freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates 
the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.”286  Justices 
in the Korematsu regime determined whether race conscious 
measures that benefited persons of color passed constitutional 
muster by analyzing the constitutional meaning of “equal 
protection.”  Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion in Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke understood affirmative action 
as raising the question whether under the “Equal Protection 
Clause . . . discrimination against members of the white 
‘majority’ cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 
‘benign.’”287  Justice William Brennan’s separate opinion in 
Bakke was similarly grounded on an “analysis of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”288 
The gap between the due process law of racial equality that 
governed federal race conscious measures and the equal 
protection law of racial equality that governed state race 
conscious measures vanished as the Korematsu regime matured.  
The Brown line of decisions began the process of obliterating the 
 
283. Id. at 112 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
284. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234-35, 242; Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.  
285. 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954). 
286. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
287. 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978). 
288. Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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differences between the federal and state law of equal protection.  
Schools segregated by federal law met the same fate as schools 
segregated by state law.  “In view of our decision that the 
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially 
segregated public schools,” Chief Justice Earl Warren stated in 
Bolling, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution 
would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”289  By 
the turn of the twenty-first century, the Justices were insisting that 
race conscious federal policies had to meet the same strict 
scrutiny standards as race conscious state policies.290  O’Connor 
in Adarand declared “congruence” to be a fundamental principle 
underlying the constitutional law of racial equality.291  Her 
opinion eviscerating any remaining space between federal and 
state obligations declared, “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth 
Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . .”292 
The Thirteenth Amendment remained largely moribund as 
an alternate textual hook for the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co., was the exception that proved the rule.293  The Justices 
in that case held that Congress under the Thirteenth Amendment 
could prohibit race discrimination in private housing markets.294  
Justice Potter Stewart’s majority opinion declared that “the 
freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the 
Thirteenth Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a 
white man can buy, the right to live wherever a white man can 
live.”295  Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court made any 
further effort to integrate this element of the Turner regime into 
the Korematsu regime.  The path-breaking federal 
antidiscrimination laws passed during the Great Society did not 
 
289. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
290. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
291. Id. at 224. 
292. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)). 
293. 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). 
294. Id. at 439. 
295. Id. at 443. 
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mention the constitutional ban on slavery.296  No Supreme Court 
opinions sustaining these measures discussed whether these 
measures might have Thirteenth Amendment foundations.297  The 
Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence paid no heed to 
the Thirteenth Amendment but focused entirely on the 
constitutional law of equal protection.298 
The resulting Fourteenth Amendment law of racial equality 
was not as friendly to affirmative action programs as Thirteenth 
Amendment law had been during Reconstruction.  In sharp 
contrast to the Turner regime, which maintained race conscious 
programs were a legitimate means for implementing the 
Thirteenth Amendment’s commitment to ending both slavery and 
the slave system, the Korematsu regime insisted on a race neutral 
interpretation of the  phrase “equal protection.”299  Justice Lewis 
Powell’s crucial opinion in Bakke stated, “[t]he guarantee of equal 
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual 
and something else when applied to a person of another color.”300  
“The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause,” 
O’Connor’s opinion in Adarand agreed, “is not dependent on the 
race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification.”301  Strict scrutiny was not quite as strict when race 
 
296. See Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73; Voting Rights Act 
of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 241.   
297. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Heart of Atlanta 
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).  Remarkably, the petitioners in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel raised a Thirteenth Amendment claim when they insisted that the prohibition 
of race discrimination was an “involuntary servitude.”  Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 
243-44. 
298. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  A cottage 
industry has developed, however, on the Thirteenth Amendment as an alternative source for 
fundamental rights, including constitutional rights to racial equality.  See Douglas L. Colbert, 
Liberating the Thirteenth Amendment, 30 HARV. CIV. RTS. CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 1 (1995); 
Rebecca E. Zietlow, Free at Last! Anti-Subordination and the Thirteenth Amendment, 90 
BOS. U. L. REV. 255 (2010); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth 
Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1459 (2012); Alexander Tsesis, Into the Light of Day: 
Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment to Contemporary Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1447 
(2012); James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges and 
Incidents of Slavery, 65 UCLA L. REV. 426 (2018); Lea S. Vandervelde, The Labor Vision 
of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1989). 
299. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944). 
300. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90. 
301. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). 
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conscious measures benefited persons of color.  O’Connor in 
Adarand “wish[ed] to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict 
in theory, but fatal in fact[]’” when government attempted to deal 
with “the lingering effects of racial discrimination.”302  Still, 
Congress and state legislatures at the turn of the twenty-first 
century did not enjoy the same leeway under the Fourteenth 
Amendment as the Reconstruction Congress had under the 
Thirteenth Amendment to promote racial equality by employing 
race conscious measures.303 
All the Judges on the Korematsu court took for granted that 
federal courts were responsible for determining the constitutional 
law of racial equality.  The majority opinions and dissents 
quarreled over whether justices should defer to the military 
judgment that excluding Japanese from the West Coast was 
necessary to prevent a possible Japanese invasion.304  None 
suggested that implementing the constitutional law of racial 
equality was primarily a legislative task.  As was the case with 
Plessy, all the Justices on the Korematsu court assumed that they 
had the final say in determining whether a measure 
unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race.305  Justice 
Frank Murphy’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi stated:  “We 
give great deference to the judgment of the Congress and of the 
military authorities as to what is necessary in the effective 
prosecution of the war, but we can never forget that there are 
constitutional boundaries which it is our duty to uphold.”306  
“While this Court sits,” he asserted, “it has the inescapable duty 
of seeing that the mandates of the Constitution are obeyed.”307  
Justice Wiley Rutledge’s concurring opinion in Hirabayashi 
rejected claims that “the courts have no power to review any 
action a military officer may ‘in his discretion’ find it necessary 
 
302. Id. at 237 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)). 
303. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 613 (1990); City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986). 
304. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24; Id. at 248 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
305. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223. 
306. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 110 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). 
307. Id. at 113. 
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to take with respect to civilian citizens in military areas or zones 
. . . .”308 
Ironically, the Plessy regime’s abandonment of legislative 
primacy made possible the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown.309  Under the Turner and Strauder regimes, Congress had 
to be the first mover when the constitutional law of racial equality 
was established.  Courts could not consider whether race 
conscious measures were unconstitutional race discriminations or 
constitutional race distinctions unless Congress had passed a law 
prohibiting the race conscious measure under constitutional 
attack.310  Senator Charles Sumner insisted during the early 1870s 
that Congress prohibit segregated schools311 because he assumed 
that courts were unlikely to declare segregated schools 
unconstitutional in the absence of federal law banning such 
institutions.  When introducing what became the Civil Rights Act 
of 1875, he spoke of “the absolute necessity of congressional 
legislation for the protection of equal rights . . . .”312  Sumner’s  
last speech in Congress maintained with respect to segregated 
schools, “I most solemnly believ[e] that the only true remedy is 
in a national statute, uniform and complete in its operation 
everywhere throughout the land . . . .”313  No such congressional 
legislation was on the books when Brown was decided.  Justice 
Robert Jackson’s comment in oral argument, “I suppose that 
realistically the reason this case is here was that action couldn’t 
be obtained from Congress[,]”314 reflected the Plessy and 
 
308. Id. at 114 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
309. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 554-55; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
310. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Strauder v. 
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1879). 
311. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner). 
312. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381 (1871) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner); see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 432 (1872) (statement of Sen. Charles 
Sumner) (“[T]hose axiomatic and self-evident truths . . . shall be maintained by the 
legislation of Congress carrying out the provisions of the Constitution of the United States.”). 
313. 2 CONG. REC. 949 (1874) (statement of Sen. Charles Sumner). 
314. Schmidt, supra note 238, at 65 (quoting LEON FRIEDMAN, ARGUMENT: THE 
ORAL ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT IN BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF 
TOPEKA, 1952-55 244 (1969)).  Jackson repeated this claim in his unpublished draft 
concurrence in Brown.  Id.  He declared, “We are urged . . . to supply means to supervise 
transition of the country from segregated to nonsegregated schools upon the basis that 
Congress may or probably will refuse to act.  That assumes nothing less than that we must 
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Korematsu regimes’ commitment to permitting federal courts to 
be the first mover in determining the constitutional law of racial 
equality.  Just as no judge on the Plessy Court considered federal 
statutory law relevant to determining whether states could 
mandate segregated street cars, so no judge on the Brown Court, 
following the practice entrenched only during the Plessy regime, 
considered federal statutory law relevant to determining whether 
states could mandate segregated public education. 
The Korematsu regime replaced legislative primacy with 
judicial supremacy.  The Justices when implementing Brown not 
only did not bother looking for guidance from the elected 
branches of the national government but insisted that all 
government officials were to be guided by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the constitutional commitment to racial equality.  
In an opinion signed by all nine Justices on the Supreme Court, 
Chief Justice Earl Warren in Cooper v. Aaron declared, “the 
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the 
Constitution, and that principle . . . [is] a permanent and 
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”315  Justice 
Felix Frankfurter’s concurring opinion piled on.  He wrote, “[o]ur 
kind of society cannot endure if the controlling authority of the 
Law as derived from the Constitution is not to be the tribunal 
specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what 
is ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’”316 
While the Supreme Court remained the managing partner 
throughout the Korematsu regime, the role of Congress in 
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality 
was sometimes analogous to senior partner, sometimes analogous 
to junior partner, and sometimes closer to summer associate.  
Katzenbach v. Morgan indicated that remedying race 
discrimination might be a joint enterprise, with federal courts and 
the federal legislature equally empowered to make the 
constitutional law of racial equality.317  Justice William Douglas’s 
 
act because our representative system has failed.”  DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUSTICE ROBERT H. 
JACKSON’S UNPUBLISHED OPINION IN BROWN V. BOARD 129 (2017). 
315. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). 
316. Id. at 24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); JAMES D. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND 
PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: ANDREW JACKSON (2004). 
317. 384 U.S. 641, 659 (1966). 
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majority opinion held that Congress could forbid states from 
denying the ballot to Spanish speakers educated in Puerto Rico, 
even though the Supreme Court had previously ruled that literacy 
tests were constitutional.318  “Congress might . . . have 
questioned,” Douglas wrote, “whether denial of a right deemed so 
precious and fundamental in our society was a necessary or 
appropriate means of encouraging persons to learn English, or of 
furthering the goal of an intelligent exercise of the franchise.”319  
City of Boerne v. Flores withdrew any suggestion in Morgan that 
Congress might be authorized to interpret independently the post-
Civil War Amendments.320  Congress was authorized to remedy, 
identify, and prevent constitutional violations, but not determine 
what actions constituted a violation of the equal protection or any 
other clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.321  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s majority opinion condemned the elected branches of 
the national government for trying to overturn a judicial decision 
narrowing the free exercise rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.322  He asserted, “[w]hen the political 
branches of the Government act against the background of a 
judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must 
be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will 
treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled 
principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations 
must be disappointed.”323  Shelby County v. Holder further 
reduced congressional power to implement the post-Civil War 
Amendments.324  Chief Justice John Roberts brazenly challenged 
whether thousands of pages of congressional factfinding justified 
legislation extending the preclearance provisions of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965.325  Congress, he insisted, had to demonstrate 
 
318. See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959); 
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941). 
319. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654; see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 342 
(1966). 
320. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 654. 
321. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-29. 
322. Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77 (1990); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
323. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
324. See generally 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
325. Id. at 554. 
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“‘exceptional’ and ‘unique’ conditions” when legislation 
implementing the constitutional commitment made during 
Reconstruction to racial equality trenched on an early 
constitutional commitment to state sovereignty.326 
A. Compared to What 
Whether Korematsu or the Korematsu regime should be 
celebrated depends on what the Korematsu regime is being 
compared to.  Korematsu fares well when compared to the Costin 
regime, which permitted states to make race discriminations on 
the ground that persons of color were racially inferior to white 
people.327  The comparison between the Korematsu regime and 
the Turner, Strauder, and Plessy regimes is more complicated.  
Each of the latter three regimes has at least one element that 
arguably better promotes racial equality than the Korematsu 
regime.  The Plessy and Strauder regimes treat race as a banned 
category.328  The Strauder and Turner regimes require Congress 
to be the first mover in implementing the post-Civil War 
Amendments.329  The Turner regime treats the Thirteenth 
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial 
equality.330  These differences make a difference, particularly 
with respect to the law of affirmative action and the state action 
doctrine.  Whether the Korematsu regime improved upon these 
past regimes depends on whether one thinks affirmative action 
promotes racial equality, whether some version of the state action 
doctrine is an appropriate limit on the constitutional commitment 
to race equality, and what institution in general at present is most 
likely to best implement the constitutional commitment to race 
equality. 
 
326. Id. at 555; South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334-35 (1966). 
327. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944); Costin v. Corp. of 
Washington, 6 F. Cas. 612, 613 (C.C.D.C. 1821) (No. 3,266). 
328. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303, 306-07 (1879). 
329. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310; In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) 
(No. 14,247). 
330. Turner, 24 F. Cas. at 339. 
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1. Banned Categories 
A contemporary Strauder or Plessy regime by taking a 
banned categories rather than a strict scrutiny approach to race 
conscious discriminations would reverse the result in Korematsu, 
at least in theory,331 and the result in Grutter.332  Both the 
Japanese exclusion order and affirmative action admissions 
programs are race discriminations as race discriminations were 
understood at the turn of the twentieth century.  Each burdens or 
benefits members of one race without providing the same or 
equivalent burden or benefit for members of another race.333  As 
such, both are per se unconstitutional under the Strauder and 
Plessy regimes, but may be constitutional under the Korematsu 
regime, which permits government officials to adopt race 
conscious measures when doing so is a narrowly tailored means 
of achieving a compelling governmental end.334  Whether 
returning to this banned categories doctrine of the Strauder and 
Plessy regimes improves upon the strict scrutiny doctrine of the 
Korematsu regime depends on the most likely forms of race 
conscious legislation, whether governing officials can be trusted 
to use race conscious measures to promote racial equality, and 
whether race conscious measures inherently violate constitutional 
commitments to race equality.   
For most of American history, Plessy’s banned categories 
approach, even restricted to race discriminations as opposed to 
race distinctions, would have better promoted race equality than 
Korematsu’s strict scrutiny test.  A few Reconstruction measures 
aside,335 race conscious federal and state laws from the 
ratification of the Constitution to the Great Society were means 
of maintaining white supremacy and almost always provided 
 
331. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
224. 
332. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003). 
333. Although, a good lawyer would claim all persons, even white persons rejected on 
racial grounds, enjoy the benefits of diversity.  See NATASHA K. WARIKOO, THE DIVERSITY 
BARGAIN AND OTHER DILEMMAS OF RACE, ADMISSIONS, AND MERITOCRACY AT ELITE 
UNIVERSITIES (Univ. of Chicago Press 2016). 
334. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306-07; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552; Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
224. 
335. Lundin, supra note 46, at 9. 
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benefits only to white people or imposed burdens only on persons 
of color.  A banned category standard would have outlawed the 
common race discriminations that dotted the antebellum 
American legal landscape and prohibited the Black Codes that 
former confederate states adopted in the immediate aftermath of 
the Civil War.336  A banned category standard applied to all race 
classifications would have prevented Jim Crow segregation.   
Many contemporary progressives have come to prefer strict 
scrutiny to banned categories because only during the last thirty 
or forty years have most explicit race conscious measures 
purported to provide benefits only to persons of color or burden 
only white persons.  A fair case can be made that from a 
progressive point of view, the benefits of a strict scrutiny review 
that allows some affirmative action admissions policies in higher 
education and some minority set-asides in government 
contracting to pass constitutional muster337 outweigh the 
occasional explicit racial profiling by law enforcement officers 
that might meet that constitutional smell test.338  Justice Stephen 
Breyer believes that the contemporary constitutional law of race 
equality must give educators at the turn of the twenty-first century 
some leeway to make race conscious decisions.  His dissenting 
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1 asserted: 
The wide variety of different integration plans that school 
districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem 
of racial segregation in schools, including de 
facto segregation, is difficult to solve.  The fact that many 
such plans have used explicitly racial criteria suggests that 
such criteria have an important, sometimes necessary, role to 
play.339  
 
336. For the Black Codes, see THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF 
THE SOUTH (Univ. of Alabama Press: Tuscaloosa eds., 1965). 
337. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 228 F.3d 
1147, 1171 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that a minority set-aside program satisfied strict 
scrutiny). 
338. The issue in most racial profiling cases is providing race consciousness, not 
determining whether an explicit race conscious profiling policy satisfies the strict scrutiny 
test.  See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
339. 551 U.S. 701, 861 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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Strict scrutiny, or even a lesser form of scrutiny, is superior to 
banned categories from a progressive perspective because race 
conscious measures may promote as well as frustrate the 
constitutional commitment to race equality as antisubordination 
or anticaste.340  Justice John Paul Stevens articulated the 
antisubordination conception of equal protection in his Adarand 
dissent.  Condemning the judicial tendency to lump all race 
conscious programs, Stevens asserted: 
The consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the 
difference between a “No Trespassing” sign and a welcome 
mat.  It would treat a Dixiecrat Senator’s decision to vote 
against Thurgood Marshall’s confirmation in order to keep 
African-Americans off the Supreme Court as on a par with 
President Johnson’s evaluation of his nominee’s race as a 
positive factor.  It would equate a law that made black 
citizens ineligible for military service with a program aimed 
at recruiting black soldiers.  An attempt by the majority to 
exclude members of a minority race from a regulated market 
is fundamentally different from a subsidy that enables a 
relatively small group of newcomers to enter that market.341  
Some higher degree of scrutiny is necessary to distinguish the 
“No Trespassing” sign from the welcome mat, but a banned 
categories approach throws out the equality promoting baby with 
the racist bathwater, so to speak. 
Conservatives prefer the Strauder regime to the Korematsu 
regime.  Justice Clarence Thomas sees no differences between the 
race conscious measures of the late Korematsu regime and those 
of the Plessy regime.  Giving contemporary “school boards a free 
hand to make decisions on the basis of race,” he maintains, is “an 
approach reminiscent of that advocated by the segregationists in 
Brown.”342  Contemporary government officials have no more 
capacity to make race conscious policies than the white 
supremacists of the past.  Thomas asks, “[c]an we really be sure 
that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott and Plessy are a 
 
340. See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification 
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1471, 1493, 1540 
(2004). 
341. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
342. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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relic of the past or that future theories will be nothing but 
beneficent and progressive?”343  More to the point, conservatives 
insist that a banned categories approach recognizes how race 
classifications are inherently injurious and by their very nature are 
inconsistent with the constitutional commitment to race equality.  
Thomas articulates the central understanding of the 
anticlassification understanding of equal protection when he 
insists, “[t]he Constitution abhors classifications based on race 
because every time the government places citizens on racial 
registers and makes race relevant to the provision of burdens or 
benefits, it demeans all of us.”344 
Strict scrutiny, these brief observations highlight, suffers 
from a Goldilocks problem.  Progressives find the test too hot.  A 
lower level of scrutiny in the twenty-first century is more than 
sufficient to root out the racist race conscious measures of the 
past,345 while permitting contemporary race conscious measures 
that promote racial equality.  Conservatives find the test too cold.  
Too often, in their view, strict scrutiny permits university 
administrators and others to mask old fashioned race 
discrimination under the guise of diversity.346  The standard that 
is “just right” awaits a less racially polarized United States. 
2. Congress or Courts 
A contemporary Turner or Strauder regime, by adopting an 
institutional commitment to legislative primacy, would maintain 
Grutter but reverse Brown.347  Courts in a regime committed to 
legislative primacy are limited to implementing federal 
legislation and determining whether federal legislation 
implementing the post-Civil War Amendments is constitutional.  
A Supreme Court committed to legislative primacy would sustain 
 
343. Id. at 781-82. 
344. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215 (2016). 
345. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting) (claiming that Japanese exclusion order was not “reasonably related to a public 
danger”). 
346. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 380-85 (2003) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the admissions at the University of Michigan Law School are more 
consistent with commitments to quotas than commitments to diversity). 
347. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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the University of Michigan’s race conscious admissions program 
as long as the Justices determined that affirmative action violated 
no federal law.348  Courts would sustain segregated schools in 
Topeka, Kansas, for the same reason.  Congress as of 1954 had 
passed no laws prohibiting race segregation in public schools.  
The result in Korematsu depends on the version of 
legislative primacy employed by government officials.  Both the 
Turner and Strauder regimes required Congress to be the first 
mover.  Courts had no independent authority to secure racial 
equality in the absence of a federal law mandating racial equality.  
Legislative primacy in the Turner regime, at least as understood 
by congressional radicals, bordered on legislative supremacy.  
Congress was empowered to determine the constitutional 
meaning of racial equality as well as the legislation that best 
implemented the constitutional commitment to racial equality.  
Courts had no business interfering when federal officials 
determined that Japanese Americans had to be excluded from the 
West Coast.  Legislative primacy in the Strauder regime was 
weaker.  Federal courts had no independent power to enforce the 
constitutional commitment to racial equality, but they were 
empowered to determine whether federal legislation was 
implementing that constitutional commitment.  The justices could 
not interfere with a state exclusion policy that Congress had not 
prohibited, but federal courts could independently determine 
whether a congressional exclusion policy met constitutional 
standards. 
Comparing the virtues and vices of the Turner/Strauder 
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy to those of the 
Korematsu regime’s commitment to independent judicial review 
is difficult.  A cottage industry exists comparing judges and 
elected officials as rights protectors.349  Much of that literature 
highlights the relative contributions the national judiciary and 
 
348. Bakke’s holding that crucial provisions of federal antidiscrimination law were 
coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause complicates this analysis.  See Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 406 (1978). 
349. See, e.g., REBECCA ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONSTITUTION, AND THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (NYU Press: New York eds., 2006); JOHN J. DINAN, 
KEEPING THE PEOPLE’S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS GUARDIANS 
OF RIGHTS (Univ. Press of Kansas: Lawrence, KS eds., 1998). 
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national legislature have made to racial equality in the United 
States.350  On the one hand, independent judicial review was once 
the only means by which persons of color could obtain relief from 
a white supremacist regime.  A court committed to legislative 
primacy would not have reached any of the Supreme Court 
decisions that declared unconstitutional state race conscious 
measures handed down before the passage of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.351  On the other hand, independent judicial review at 
present is at least as much a boon to white persons challenging 
race conscious laws promoting racial equality as to persons of 
color challenging race conscious laws preserving white 
supremacy.  Federal law now protects numerous rights of race 
equality and almost certainly would protect against all 
manifestations of twentieth century Jim Crow if constitutional 
doctrine required Congress to pass additional laws prohibiting 
traditional forms of race segregation.  State affirmative action 
policies and state minority set-aside programs are the two most 
prominent race conscious measures that contemporary courts 
committed to legislative primacy would not adjudicate.  
Disaggregating judicial decisions and federal laws for the 
purpose of determining the merits of legislative primacy 
compounds these difficulties.  Some scholars think Supreme 
Court decisions independently implementing the post-Civil War 
Amendments inspired federal laws prohibiting garden-variety 
race discriminations.352  Michael Klarman’s backlash thesis 
proposes that massive resistance to Brown stirred northerners to 
support such measures as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965.353  Legislative primacy, in this view, 
ignores how judicial decisions often spur vital congressional 
actions promoting race equality.  Gerald Rosenberg insists that 
 
350. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 11; LESLIE F. GOLDSTEIN, THE U.S. SUPREME 
COURT AND RACIAL MINORITIES: TWO CENTURIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW ON TRIAL 
(Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, UK eds., 2017). 
351. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 
649 (1944); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
352. See ARYEH NEIER, ONLY JUDGMENT: THE LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL 
CHANGE 241-42 (Wesleyan Univ. Press: Middleton, CT eds., 1982). 
353. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 
80 VA. L. REV. 7, 85 (1994). 
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independent judicial review is a distraction.354  Brown and related 
judicial decisions neither directly achieved much desegregation 
nor inspired federal legislation prohibiting segregation.355  
Legislative primacy, in this view, is institutional 
acknowledgement that federal legislation and executive 
enforcement are the necessary ingredients of a regime committed 
to racial equality.   
Matters are further complicated when the distinction 
between strong Turner legislative primacy and weak Strauder 
legislative primacy are thrown into the comparative mix.  
Turner’s combination of legislative primacy and legislative 
supremacy keeps judicial hands off federal affirmative action 
programs and voting rights laws, as well as off all state race 
conscious measures that are not forbidden by federal law.  
Strauder’s legislative primacy and judicial supremacy empowers 
courts to determine the constitutionality of federal laws 
mandating affirmative action programs and implementing the 
Fifteenth Amendment, but not race conscious state laws, unless 
those state laws are prohibited by federal law.  The Korematsu 
and Strauder regime’s commitment to judicial supremacy 
permitted the Supreme Court to strike down the preclearance 
formula Congress mandated when reauthorizing the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, but the result in Shelby County could not have 
been reached by judges who adopted the legislative supremacy 
commitments of radical Republicans during the Turner regime. 
Legislative primacy is most attractive when the dominant 
national party has the commitment and power necessary to enact 
comprehensive measures promoting race equality.  This 
combination of commitment and power has occurred only twice 
in American history and for relatively short periods of time.356  A 
burst of civil rights legislation occurred during Reconstruction 
and during the Great Society.357  During these periods, elected 
 
354. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE 420-29 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing 
“The Fly-Paper Court”). 
355. See id. at 39-169. 
356. See PHILIP A. KLINKNER, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 79-81 (Univ. of Chicago Press: Chicago eds., 1999). 
357. Id. 
2 GRABER.MAN.FIN COPY.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/21  2:47 PM 
2021 KOREMATSU’S ANCESTORS 489 
 
officials could be trusted to implement the constitutional 
commitment to racial equality at least as extensively (weak 
legislative primacy) and probably more extensively (strong 
legislative primacy) as federal courts.  At all other times in 
American history, justices have been more committed to racial 
equality than elected officials, even when that judicial 
commitment is quite weak.358 
Americans may be entering a third period in which some 
version of legislative primacy is an attractive means for securing 
racial equality, at least as racial equality is understood by 
contemporary progressives.359  Democrats in the 2020 national 
election gained control of all three branches of the national 
government.  Persons of color make up a substantial part of the 
Democrat electorate and compose an increasing percentage of the 
Democrats in the legislative and executive branches of 
government.360  By comparison, the judicial branch of the 
national government for the foreseeable future, the Supreme 
Court in particular, will be controlled by very conservative 
Republicans.  Five of these Justices are older white men who are 
not old enough that one could safely predict they will leave the 
bench in the foreseeable future.  Given the dramatically different 
understandings of racial equality likely to animate the elected 
branches of the national government and the national judiciary, 
progressives might be better off returning to the weak legislative 
primacy of the Strauder regime, which did not permit the 
Supreme Court to strike down state laws in the absence of a 
federal law prohibiting such measures, and even better off 
returning to the strong legislative primacy championed by 
Republican radicals during the Turner regime, which vested 
Congress with the power to determine the constitutional meaning 
of racial equality. 
 
358. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 350, at 372, 375. 
359. This paragraph relies heavily on Jack M. Balkin, Race and The Cycles of 
Constitutional Time, MO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), [https://perma.cc/28PQ-GZT3]. 
360. In Changing U.S. Electorate, Race, and Education Remain Stark Dividing Lines, 
PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 2, 2020), [https://perma.cc/5B94-T2LH]; Anna Brown & Sara Atske, 
Black Americans Have Made Gains in U.S. Political Leadership, but Gaps Remain, PEW 
RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2021), [https://perma.cc/5NW5-QGTT]. 
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3. Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment 
The Turner regime that regarded the Thirteenth Amendment 
as the textual hook for the constitutional law of racial equality 
might reverse Korematsu, but not Grutter.  The point of the 
constitutional law of racial equality, from the perspective of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, is to ensure that former slaves and other 
victims of racial prejudice are treated as equal members of the 
American polity.  Race neutrality is a means to that end and not 
the end sought.  Korematsu was wrongly decided because the 
exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast was rooted 
in historical prejudices against immigrants from Japan and other 
Asian countries.  Grutter was rightly decided because affirmative 
action programs are designed to help persons of color become 
equal citizens, do not reflect historic prejudice against white 
persons, and are not designed to reduce white persons to second-
class citizenship. 
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race 
equality are partly yoked to the merits of affirmative action.  
Progressives are likely to celebrate a Thirteenth Amendment law 
of race equality because the constitutional ban on slavery 
provides stronger foundations for affirmative action programs 
than does the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Thirteenth 
Amendment is about caste.  Congress is empowered to eradicate 
slavery and the slave system.  The persons who have rights under 
the Thirteenth Amendment are those who have experienced 
slavery, the slave system, the badges and incidents of slavery, or 
the aftereffects of slavery.  White persons have no rights under 
the Thirteenth Amendment because members of that class have 
never experienced slavery, the slave system, the badges and 
incidents of slavery, or the aftereffects of slavery.  Conservatives 
are more likely to celebrate a Fourteenth Amendment law of 
racial equality that is more open to being interpreted as 
articulating a constitutional commitment to race neutrality or 
colorblindness.  The text of the Fourteenth Amendment provides 
no special treatment for former slaves or their descendants.  All 
persons, whatever their race, must be treated equally.  White 
persons complaining about affirmative action programs have 
some history as well as text on their side.  The evidence suggests 
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that the Joint Committee on Reconstruction abandoned a version 
of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment limited to race 
discrimination in favor of the race neutral Equal Protection 
Clause precisely because the latter was thought to better protect 
persons of all races.361 
The merits of the Thirteenth Amendment law of race 
equality are even more firmly yoked to the state action doctrine.  
Justices in the Strauder, Plessy, and Korematsu regimes insisted 
that the state action requirement was a necessary element of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s law of race equality.362  The Turner 
regime, which regarded the Thirteenth Amendment as the source 
of the constitutional law of race equality, had no state action 
requirement.363  This state action requirement clearly inhibits 
efforts to achieve race equality in the United States.  Justices have 
wielded state action when striking down federal bans on 
discrimination against persons of color in places of public 
accommodation,364 when permitting racially restrictive covenants 
in American housing markets,365 and when allowing private clubs 
with state liquor licenses to refuse to admit black members or 
guests.366  A Thirteenth Amendment law of race equality might 
permit the Justices to reach a more racially egalitarian result in 
each of these circumstances on the ground that private 
discrimination is a feature of a slave system or a badge and 
incident of slavery.367  The Korematsu regime’s commitment to a 
state action doctrine that imposes limits on efforts to secure race 
equality can be justified, if justified at all, only if state action has 
other constitutional benefits that outweigh the costs that doctrine 
imposes on efforts to remove the substantial race prejudice 
vestiges of the American slave system.   
 
361. See Earl M. Maltz, Moving Beyond Race: The Joint Committee on Reconstruction 
and the Drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 287, 297, 315 
(2015).  
362. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 
323 (1926); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
363. See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Jones v. 
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412-13 (1968). 
364. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3. 
365. See, e.g., Corrigan, 271 U.S. 323. 
366. See, e.g., Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163. 
367. See supra notes 362-66 and accompanying text. 
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4. Packages 
Doctrines, institutional authority, and textual hooks come in 
packages. Legislative primacy complements the Thirteenth 
Amendment as the textual hook for the constitutional law of race 
conscious measures.  Congress is better positioned than the 
Supreme Court to determine what practices maintain the status 
hierarchies first established by the antebellum slave system and 
how those status hierarchies are best dismantled without harming 
other social interests.  The number of employees that should 
trigger antidiscrimination obligations raise questions of 
constitutional policy best resolved by a legislature rather than 
questions of constitutional law best adjudicated by a court.  The 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is more 
conducive to the rule-bound analysis typically performed by 
justices.  The closer to “sameness” the rules for implementing the 
constitutional commitment to race equality, the better courts are 
at constitutional decision making.  The Justices who adjudicated 
the cases challenging school segregation could have easily 
determined that school districts were employing race conscious 
measures,368 that the schools for students of color were inferior to 
the schools for white students,369 and that in the United States 
students of color could have never enjoyed equal education in 
racially segregated schools.370   
The Korematsu regime may be the best package Americans 
can achieve.  That regime offers a Goldilocks solution to the 
problem of legislative discretion.  The Costin and Turner regimes 
give elected officials too much power over race conscious 
measures.  The banned categories approach of the Strauder and 
Plessy regimes gives elected officials too little discretion.  Strict 
scrutiny with judicial review is “just right.”  Affirmative action 
policies pass constitutional muster, as long as they do not use 
racial quotas explicitly and give individualized consideration to 
all applicants.371  The state action doctrine remains a limit on 
efforts to achieve race equality.  Nevertheless, as Terri Peretti has 
 
368. See Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, 632-33 (1948). 
369. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950). 
370. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
371. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
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detailed, the justices tend to apply that requirement only when 
race is not on the table.372  Goldilocks strikes again, achieving a 
balance between prohibiting private race discrimination and 
maintaining individual freedom that is close to “just right.” 
Comparing the Korematsu regime only to the Costin regime 
or the worst features (of which there were many) of the Plessy 
regime forecloses discussion of the contributions the Thirteenth 
Amendment, legislative primacy, and banned categories might 
make to the constitutional law of race equality.  The Turner, 
Strauder, and Plessy regimes all promote racial equality in some 
instances when the Korematsu regime tolerates race conscious 
measures that discriminate against persons of color.  The Turner 
regime’s commitment to the Thirteenth Amendment facilitates 
bans on private discrimination.  The Turner and Strauder 
regime’s commitment to legislative primacy gives Congress the 
leeway to determine how best to dismantle racial hierarchies.  The 
Strauder and Plessy regime’s commitment to banned categories 
forecloses legislative excuses for race discrimination.  Korematsu 
is not the only way, these alternatives demonstrate, even if that 
way is better than much of what preceded that understanding of 
the constitutional law of race equality. 
 
 
372. See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275 (2010). 
